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COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING: 
THE PROMOTION OF A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT 
AND THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD UNDER 
ARTICLE 101 
TOM C. HODGE* 
ABSTRACT 
The antitrust, or competition, regime of the European Union (EU) dif-
fers substantially from that of the United States, because EU competition 
law forms part of the EU Treaties and is therefore imbibed with the mul-
tiple values of the European Union itself. Accordingly, it is by no means 
clear or settled if the anti-cartel law of the European Union, Article 101 
TFEU, must focus solely on a consumer welfare standard or must also 
consider the broad and multiple policy aims enshrined in the EU Treaties. 
If Article 101 must balance multiple aims, this would be in stark contrast 
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, where the sole goal of consumer welfare 
has long been established.
1
 
This Article will seek to demonstrate that when an agreement is ex-
amined under Article 101, any anti-competitive impact that is detrimental 
to consumer welfare must be balanced against the positive effect on the 
policy goals of the EU (with the Article focusing particularly on employ-
ment issues). The Article further proposes that a “bifurcated balancing 
approach” should be adopted, with economic efficiency concerns being 
examined under Article 101(1) and broader policy goals being considered 
in Article 101(3). The proposals made in this Article are not wholly with-
out controversy, but are supported by the case law of the European Court 
of Justice. 
                                                 
* LL.B. 2009, King’s College London; LL.M. 2010, Vanderbilt University Law 
School; LL.M.(R) 2011, University of Edinburgh Law School. The author is a New York 
attorney and trainee solicitor of England and Wales at the London office of Jones Day. 
The author wishes to thank Dr. Robert Lane, University of Edinburgh Law School. All 
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1 MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 41 
(2010) [hereinafter DABBAH, COMPARATIVE COMPETITION]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU or the Union) has been described by former 
Commissioner for Competition and current Commissioner for Digital 
Agenda, Neelie Kroes, as “a radical experiment in the creation of open 
markets.”2 Such a radical union lists among its aims: “[T]he sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full em-
ployment and social progress.”3 The question this Article seeks to answer 
is whether the EU, being a union with such diverse political and economic 
aims, can or should balance economic efficiency goals against other 
broader public policy aims within its competition law regime. 
In particular, this Article will examine Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 101 TFEU is the 
Union’s anti-cartel provision.4 Article 101(1) prohibits: “[A]ll agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market.”5 However, such agreements can 
be “excepted,” or exempted, under Article 101(3) if the agreement meets 
four tests: (1) an efficiency test, (2) provides a fair share for consumers, 
                                                 
2 Neelie Kroes, Industrial Policy and Competition Law and Policy, 30 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1401, 1402 (2007). 
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3, ¶ 3, Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do 
?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML. 
4 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
101, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML. 
5 Id. at art. 101(1) (“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the inter-
nal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.”). 
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(3) a test of proportionality, and (4) the agreement does not eliminate 
competition.6 
The wording of Article 101 sets out the bare legal bones of the EU’s 
anti-cartel regime, but the Article requires the flesh of case law and Com-
mission Guidelines and Decisions in order to make sense of what the aims 
of Article 101 should be. This Article will seek to demonstrate, relying on 
judgments and decisions, that the aims of Article 101 should be diverse 
and not limited to only an economic efficiency aim. As will be shown, this 
is in keeping with the structure of the TFEU7 and the case law of the Eu-
ropean Courts—particularly the European Court of Justice (ECJ)8 and, to a 
lesser extent, the Court of First Instance (CFI).9 Throughout the course of 
this Article, the terminology “Court of First Instance” will be used, in spite 
of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty changed the name of the CFI to the 
“General Court;”10 this will be done for the sake of consistency and in 
order to avoid confusion. It should also be noted that Article 101 was 
previously numbered as Article 8111 in the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community which preceded the TFEU (and prior to that as Article 
8512); as such, much of the literature, judgments and Commission docu-
ments refer to Articles 85 or 81, rather than Article 101. However, all such 
references are equally applicable to Article 101. 
                                                 
6 See id. at art. 101(3) (“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared in-
applicable in the case of: 
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.”). 
7 See infra Part IV.A. 
8 See, e.g., Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van 
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1653. 
9 See, e.g., Joined Cases T-528, T-542, T-543 & T-546/93, Métropole Télévision v. 
Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-652. 
10 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community art. 2(2)(n), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [herein-
after Lisbon Treaty]. 
11 See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, Nov. 10, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3. 
12 See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 85, Mar. 25, 
1957, 28 U.N.T.S. II. 
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The significance of the aims of the Union’s competition regime cannot 
be overstated. The ECJ has described Article 101 as “a fundamental provi-
sion which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
[Union].”13 More recently, Advocate-General Kokott has stated that the 
EU’s competition rules are, “without any doubt a fundamental aim of the 
Treaties.”14 Therefore, Article 101, and EU competition law in general, 
have been given the responsibility of achieving not only economic effi-
ciency goals, but also the broader aims of the EU.15 Accordingly, any 
changes to the structure of the EU Treaties that promote or demote Union 
goals have a tremendous impact on the functioning of Article 101 itself.16 
As such, this Article will seek to demonstrate that the standard economic 
efficiency test for competition law, consumer welfare, can be balanced 
against the promotion of a high level of employment. Promoting a high 
level of employment is required by Article 9 TFEU,17 and the structure of 
the EU Treaties requires “consistency between [the EU’s] policies and 
activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with 
the principle of conferral of powers.”18 Therefore, this Article will estab-
lish that Article 101 must weigh the potential employment benefits of any 
agreement against the anticompetitive impact that the agreement could 
have on consumer welfare. 
Determining whether there is a place for the promotion of employment 
within a competition provision is particularly pertinent at this time. This is 
not simply because the amendments wrought by the Lisbon Treaty down-
graded competition as a Union aim and bolstered the position of other 
public policy goals, such as employment.19 Additionally, the economic 
climate of recent years has once again called into question “what kind of 
society we are and should strive to be.”20 Is an economic efficiency goal 
all we want from a competition regime, or do we want a regulatory system 
that is more holistic and better able to consider what might benefit society 
                                                 
13 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 
I-3055, ¶ 36. 
14 Case C-110/10 P, Solvay SA v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 161) ¶ 169. 
15 See TFEU, supra note 4, at 50–58. 
16 See infra Part IV.A. 
17 TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 9 (“In defining and implementing its policies and activi-
ties, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high 
level of employment.”). 
18 Id. at art. 7. 
19 See infra Part IV.A. 
20 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospec-
tive: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 957 
(1987). 
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as a whole? As such, the “financial crisis provides an excellent opportuni-
ty to reflect about the economic orientation”21 of the Union, and to deter-
mine whether the EU’s competition system merely protects individuals as 
consumers (that is, as purchasers of goods and services) or whether this 
concern should be balanced against the individual’s role as a producer 
(that is, when the individual manufactures or provides goods and services). 
In order to demonstrate that not only should Article 101 consider, but 
in fact must consider, the promotion of a high level of employment, this 
Article will be divided into two broad parts. Parts I, II, and III of the Ar-
ticle will deal generally with the concept, and aims, of competition law. 
Parts IV and V will focus specifically on EU competition law and will 
demonstrate how consumer welfare and employment are to be balanced 
under Article 101. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION LAW 
Competition law is not a new concept, nor is it a simple one. Competi-
tion laws can trace their origins back to Ancient Greece22 and Egypt.23 
Before considering the development of competition law in the modern 
world it is worth asking what competition is, and what competition law 
does. 
Competition is defined as a “struggle or contention for superiority.”24 
Therefore, in a commercial marketplace, “[c]ompetition is about the 
struggle by firms to achieve superiority over other firms.”25 The econom-
ics of competition law will be discussed below, in Part II;26 however, it 
can be stated that competition reaps substantial economic benefits.27 Odu-
du identifies the benefits of competition as being “economic growth” and 
better quality products being more widely available at a lower cost.28 It 
can therefore be suggested that competitive markets are a “good thing,” as 
                                                 
21 Constanze Semmelmann, The European Union’s Economic Constitution Under the 
Lisbon Treaty: Soul-Searching Among Lawyers Shifts the Focus to Procedure, 35 EUR. L. 
REV. 516, 516 (2010). 
22 See THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 5 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed. 
2007) [hereinafter Faull & Nikpay]. 
23 See LORENZO F. PACE, EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW: PROHIBITIONS, MERGER 
CONTROL AND PROCEDURES 3 (2007). 
24 RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 3 (6th ed. 2008). 
25 ROBERT LANE, EC COMPETITION LAW 6 (2000). 
26 See infra Part II. 
27 See OKEOGHENE ODUDU, THE BOUNDARIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW: THE SCOPE 
OF ARTICLE 81, at 10 (2006). 
28 Id. 
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Bishop and Walker wrote: “It is a generally accepted principle that compe-
tition is desirable.”29 
If competition is a “good thing,” what role does competition law play? 
The role of competition law is to prevent a “[l]essening of competition.”30 
That is to say competition law protects the market from “artificial re-
straints”31 that might distort the “efficient allocation of resources.”32 Es-
sentially, competition law involves itself in ensuring that private actors 
(firms) do not seek to abuse their strength in the marketplace (either indi-
vidually or collaboratively) by indulging in behavior that results in a profit 
margin that is greater than that which the firm, or firms, could generate in 
a freely competitive market.33 This concept of competition law is shown in 
the law of the European Union, which prohibits the “prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition”34 and the abuse of a “dominant posi-
tion.”35 
This suggests a difficult balancing act for competition law. On the one 
hand, governments encourage competition in the marketplace; however, if 
one firm succeeds in dominating their market, the firm risks coming under 
scrutiny because of its success.36 This has caused competition law, or at 
least the excessive use of it, to come in for criticism.37 Sautet levels the 
accusation that competition law undermines the desire to succeed in the 
marketplace by “chang[ing] the rules in order to protect some groups 
against others.”38 Bork states that competition law represents “elaborate 
deployments of governmental force” into the business world,39 which is 
arguably inappropriate given that success in a free market requires entre-
preneurialism and individualism. 
                                                 
29 SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW: 
CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 15 (3d ed. 2010). 
30 Frederic Sautet, The Shaky Foundations of Competition Law, N.Z. L.J. 186, 189 
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262999. 
31 Erich Hoppmann, Workable Competition: The Development of an Idea on the Norm 
for the Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968). 
32 JACQUES PELKMANS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: METHODS AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 224 (3d ed. 2006). 
33 See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2004). 
34 TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(1). 
35 Id. at art. 102. 
36 See GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 4 (2007). 
37 See id. at 2. 
38 Sautet, supra note 30, at 190. 
39 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 3 
(1993). 
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Clearly the concept of competition law, without even discussing its 
aims, is not free from controversy.40 Accordingly, it is necessary to under-
stand the historical background that gave rise to competition law in its 
present form. The roots of modern competition law can be found in the 
common law of England.41 Conduct that fell afoul of the common law of 
competition was often described as a “restraint of trade.”42 Lord Justice 
Bowen went further and explained when conduct violated England’s 
somewhat haphazard and primitive competition laws: “[C]ompetition 
ceases to be the lawful exercise of trade, and so to be a lawful excuse for 
what will harm another, if carried to a length which is not fair or reasona-
ble.”43 Although prohibiting conduct that is unfair or unreasonable is un-
likely to be specific enough to guide future conduct, it does show that, 
even at this early stage, the courts were seeking to use competition laws to 
protect free competition in the marketplace. 
Borrowing from English common law terminology, the Sherman Act 
of the United States prohibited restraints of trade.44 In the United States, 
competition law is known as “antitrust,”45 the reason for this being that the 
Sherman Act had been passed specifically to combat business “trusts” (or 
cartels).46 These trusts consisted of firms operating in the same industry—
cooperating to make price and output decisions collectively.47 The purpose 
of trusts was to protect firms from the risks of failure inherent in a free 
market.48 Looking elsewhere in the world, we see that the language of 
competition is not unilingual. Germany has two “competition” laws: Ge-
setz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)49 and Gesetz gegen den 
unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG).50 The GWB, or Kartellrecht, can be seen 
as the more familiar form of competition law and protects against re-
                                                 
40 See MONTI, supra note 36, at 2. 
41 See, e.g., The Case of the Tailors, 11 Co. Rep. 53a, 54a (1614); 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 
1220 (Eng.); see also The Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 615 
(C.A.) (Bowen L.J.) (Eng.). 
42 The Case of the Tailors, 11 Co. Rep. at 54a. 
43 Mogul Steamship, 23 Q.B.D. at 615. 
44 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (“Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
45 See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 30. 
46 See id. at 3. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB, Act Against Restraints of Com-
petition], Aug. 26, 1998 BGBl. I at 2114 (2005) [hereinafter GWB]. 
50 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UGW, Act Against Unfair Competition], 
Mar. 7, 2004 BGBl. I at 254 (2005) [hereinafter UGW]. 
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straints of trade,51 whereas the UWG, or Wettbewerbsrecht, forbids unfair 
competitive acts that are detrimental to competitors and consumers, in-
cluding activities such as misleading advertising.52 In the Republic of 
Korea, the primary competition statute is the Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act of 1980.53 The Slovak Republic’s national competition law 
is the law on Protection of Competition.54 In France, competition law is 
known as the “droit de la concurrence.”55 All this points to the fact that 
“competition law regimes do not necessarily have to be consistently called 
“competition law” for these laws to be capable of addressing the same 
problematic situations or functioning as proper competition laws.”56 
Returning to the nineteenth century origins of modern competition 
law, it is worth noting that cartels were not unique to the United States. 
Cartels were prevalent across Europe.57 In the German Empire they were 
positively encouraged, as the government believed cartelisation would 
protect Germany from foreign competition.58 World War I and its after-
math did not diminish the enthusiasm for cartels in Europe.59 In 1926, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Saar (then a territory 
governed by Britain and France under a League of Nations mandate) 
agreed to form an international steel cartel (Rohstahlgemeinschaft).60 In-
deed, in 1930 the Briand Plan proposed forming a European Union “based 
on economic cartels.”61 
It was not until after World War II that continental Europe moved 
away from the promotion of cartels. The U.S. military government in post-
World War II Germany introduced Law 56, which intended to eliminate 
“concentrations of economic power.”62 Law 56 laid the foundations for the 
                                                 
51 See GWB, supra note 49, at 2114. 
52 See UGW, supra note 50, at 254. 
53 See ⓹㥄ἐ㥐 ⵃ ḩ㥉ᶤ⣌㜄 Ḵ䚐 ⷉ⪔ [Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act], ⷉ⪔ 㥐3320䝬 [Act No. 3320] (S. Kor.). 
54 See Zákon  . 136/2001 Z. z. o ochrane hospodárskej sú!aže [Protection of Competi-
tion] (Slovk.). 
55 See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM] art. L420-1 (Fr.). 
56 DABBAH, COMPARATIVE COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 17. 
57 See PACE, supra note 23, at 5. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 7. 
60 See id. at 13; see also CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE: 
STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER WORLD WAR I, 
at 526 (1975). 
61 PACE, supra note 23, at 15. 
62 U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY PROCLAMATION NO. 56 Preamble (Mar. 
1, 1947). 
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growth of modern anti-cartel competition laws in Europe. It was because 
of this early exposure to U.S.-style antitrust law that “German competition 
lawyers trained in that postwar era for many years remained the intellec-
tual aristocracy of the European competition bar.”63 The European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), formed by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, 
began to spread competition/antitrust concepts across the continent.64 In 
1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and fifty years later the European Union succeeded the European 
Community.65 The original competition laws laid down in the Treaty of 
Paris—for those six Member States who were members of the ECSC66—
were to serve as the basis for the current competition laws of the twenty-
seven Member State European Union.67 European competition laws “can 
be traced back, at least in their basic elements, to the articles dealing with 
competition issues in the Treaty of Paris.”68 So Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU can show a pedigree going back to at least 1951, if not further, and 
back to Law 56 of 1947.69 
It is clear that the concept underlying competition law is, ironically, 
the idea that regulation is required to protect free competition in the mar-
ket. Furthermore, modern competition law came into being in the nine-
teenth century, and European Union competition law has existed since the 
1950s.70 However, what is still not clear is what the aim, or aims, of com-
petition law should be. Competition law can be defined as those laws 
“which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a 
way that is detrimental to society.”71 Yet this definition is meaningless, as 
it still does not expand on what aims competition law should have until 
                                                 
63 John H. Shenefield, Coherence or Confusion: The Future of the Global Antitrust 
Conversation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 385, 390 (2004). 
64 See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13. 
65 See TEU, supra note 3, at art. 1. 
66 See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13 (the ECSC members were: Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany); see also The 
Benelux, UK TRADE & INVESTMENT, http://www.invest.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/export/coun 
tries/beneluxcountries.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
67 See TEU, supra note 3, at art. 52 (the Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulga-
ria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
68 MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13. 
69 See U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY PROCLAMATION NO. 56 Preamble 
(Mar. 1, 1947); see also MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13. 
70 See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 3, 13. 
71 Id. at 30. 
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there is clarification as to what exactly “detrimental to society” means.72 
However, before considering the aims of competition law, it is important 
to recognize the impact of economics upon the underlying theories of 
competition law.73 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION 
Although this Article does not seek to deal in detail with the econom-
ics of competition, it is necessary to consider economics because econom-
ic analysis underpins the law of competition. The European Union is a 
relative newcomer to relying heavily on economic analysis when consider-
ing competition law issues.74 In-depth economic analysis of competition 
law issues is historically more often associated with U.S. antitrust law.75 
White explains that, by the 1970s, economists were actively participating 
in U.S. antitrust cases, working for both the Department of Justice and 
defendants.76 However, economic analysis has more recently begun to 
play a significant role in EU competition law (Monti identifies the Green 
Paper on Vertical Restraints
77 as “the first serious and sustained attempt 
to deploy economic analysis to [EU] competition law”).78 The adoption of 
economic principles is because these principles provide “a coherent 
framework of analysis” to “tell the most plausible story” in determining 
“under what conditions anticompetitive outcomes are very unlikely, very 
likely, or rather likely.”79 Monti attributes the late blooming of economic 
analysis in European competition law to the fact that the EU is dominated 
by Member States with civil law systems, and that the common law is 
more open to accepting economic “consequentialist reasoning” than the 
civil law, which favors “resolving problems by a literal interpretation of 
the statutes.”80 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 See infra Part II. 
74 See Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, at exec. summary 1, COM 
(1996) 721 final (Jan. 22, 1997), 4 C.M.L.R. 519 (1997) [hereinafter Green Paper on 
Vertical Restraints]. 
75 See Lawrence J. White, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on 
Antitrust: An Extended Discussion 12–13 (N.Y.U., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=1091531. 
76 See id. 
77 See Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 74, at exec. summary 1. 
78 MONTI, supra note 36, at 82. 
79 Faull & Nikpay, supra note 22, at 4. 
80 MONTI, supra note 36, at 80. 
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At the outset, it is important to note that economists have traditionally 
considered the cornerstone of competition law and policy to be the promo-
tion of “social welfare.”81 Social welfare is a state of affairs whereby eco-
nomic efficiency is maximized, and the most benefits accrue to society as 
a whole.82 However, social welfare is “value neutral (it values consumer[s] 
and producer[s] ... equally)” which, “in practice ... leads to redistribution 
from consumers to producers.”83 As such, economists have moved from 
maximizing total, or social, welfare towards maximizing consumer wel-
fare.84 Consumer welfare is a situation where economic efficiency is en-
hanced “in order to achieve lower prices, increase choice, and improve 
product quality for the benefit of the consumer.”85 Aims of competition 
law, such as consumer welfare, will be discussed below in Part III.86 How-
ever, for the present purpose—the economics of competition—it is impor-
tant to understand what welfare standard economists use when analyzing 
firm behavior through the lens of competition economics. 
To consider the role of economics in competition law, the following 
areas will be briefly discussed: (1) the economic efficiencies that competi-
tion law seeks to promote and protect, (2) the economic models of the 
market, (3) market definition, and (4) market power. Market power is the 
key to understanding the role of economics in competition law, and all the 
other areas merely set the scene so that market power can be determined. 
A. The Economic Efficiencies that Competition Law Seeks to Promote and 
Protect 
The efficiencies that competition in the marketplace encourages are: 
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, and dynamic efficiency. Al-
locative efficiency (also known as Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency, or wealth maximization) is a state of affairs whereby the consumer 
is able to purchase the product or service they want at the price they are 
prepared to pay.87 This coinciding of product and price occurs because 
manufacturers will continue to produce until the marginal cost (the cost of 
                                                 
81 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 29, at 29. 
82 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Wel-
fare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987). 
83 CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (2009). 
84 See id. 
85 MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 52 (2003) 
[hereinafter DABBAH, ANTITRUST POLICY]. 
86 See infra Part III. 
87 WHISH, supra note 24, at 4–5; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 23 (2d ed. 
2001). 
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producing an additional unit of output) and the marginal revenue (the price 
that the manufacturer would obtain for a unit of production) meet.88 This 
means that, in a competitive market, the manufacturer will continue to 
produce until the production of additional units ceases to be profitable. In 
other words, resources are allocated precisely according to society’s 
needs, “as consumers can obtain the amounts of goods or services they 
require at the price they are prepared to pay.”89 
Productive efficiency has been described as “symmetrical” to alloca-
tive efficiency.90 Productive efficiency occurs when the manufacturer 
provides goods and services at the lowest possible cost.91 This results in 
society’s wealth being expended at the lowest possible level.92 In such a 
situation, the manufacturer will not seek to raise prices above costs, as this 
will result in customers abandoning the manufacturer and may encourage 
other competitors to enter the marketplace.93 Additionally, a manufacturer 
will not drop his prices below cost,94 as this will result in a failure to make 
a profit.95 
A final form of efficiency, “which cannot be proved scientifically,”96 
is dynamic efficiency. This potential benefit of a competitive market re-
sults in innovation and technological development, as manufacturers will 
compete with each other for a fixed number of consumer purchases.97 
Of these three forms of efficiency, the one that competition most ac-
tively seeks to promote is arguably allocative efficiency. For Posner, this 
is because competition laws are only capable of promoting allocative effi-
ciency.98 Of course, a competitive marketplace is also likely to promote 
productive efficiency, because manufacturers will seek to operate as effi-
ciently as possible—in other words, to keep their costs as low as possi-
ble—or they will be driven from the market by their more efficient rivals. 
However, while productive efficiency works as an economic theory of 
firm behavior, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the law to pro-
                                                 
88 WHISH, supra note 24, at 5. 
89 Id. 
90 BORK, supra note 39, at 104. 
91 WHISH, supra note 24, at 5. 
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94 It should be explained that, in economic theory, the term ‘cost’ includes a ‘rate of 
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mote. It is possibly easier to promote allocative efficiency through encour-
aging competitive economic models of the marketplace. These economic 
models will now be considered. 
B. The Economic Models of the Market 
In economic theory there are two extreme models of the marketplace: 
perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect competition “bears little rela-
tion to reality”99 and “does not seem to be attainable;”100 as such, perfect 
competition remains theoretical. A monopoly situation is possible but also 
rare. In developed countries a monopoly is usually the result of govern-
ment action; for example, the state legally creates a sole government-
owned company that monopolizes the defense industry.101 In developing 
countries, monopolies are more likely to occur naturally because of the 
national economy being dominated by a handful of “firms, individuals and 
families” due to the “concentration of wealth within society.”102 
It is under perfect competition that allocative and productive efficiency 
will be achieved. This is because, in a perfectly competitive market, no 
firm has the power to raise prices by restricting output; otherwise, a rival 
firm will fill this void.103 Therefore, every manufacturer in the market-
place will continue to produce until marginal cost meets marginal reve-
nue.104 However, perfect competition can only be theoretical because 
achieving a perfectly competitive marketplace would require: (1) all man-
ufacturers to be producing homogenous goods, (2) that the consumers 
possessed all relevant information about the marketplace, and (3) that 
there were no “barriers to entry” to prevent other manufacturers entering 
the marketplace.105 In reality, goods are not homogeneous, especially 
because manufacturers must promote their brand as unique or different to 
secure and promote their market share. Equally, consumers are not com-
pletely informed about the market and, in almost all situations, barriers to 
entry exist.106 
Given that no market will be perfectly competitive, it could be ques-
tioned what purpose the theory of perfect competition serves to inform 
                                                 
99 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 29, at 22. 
100 DABBAH, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 85, at 24. 
101 See, e.g., WHISH, supra note 24, at 843. 
102 DABBAH, COMPARATIVE COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 297. 
103 See WHISH, supra note 24, at 5. 
104 See id. 
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competition law. Although perfect competition can never be achieved, 
competition law should seek to push markets in that direction to encourage 
“the most effective use of scarce resources,”107 and because regulation of 
the market can achieve workable competition.108 Workable competition 
can be equated with effective competition; although, unfortunately, effec-
tive competition is a concept that Bishop and Walker are unable to formal-
ly define.109 To determine if a market is subject to effective, or workable, 
competition requires “an analysis of the current structure of the market 
and behavior of the firms within the market.”110 This is in keeping with the 
Extended SCP framework of analysis, discussed infra.111 
Workable competition cannot be achieved in a monopoly situation. A 
monopoly is defined as: “[A] seller (or group of sellers acting like a single 
seller) who can change the price at which his product will sell in the mar-
ket by changing the quantity that he sells.”112 Essentially, a monopolist, 
free from the restraints of competition, will not manufacture enough goods 
to meet consumer demand; therefore, the scarcity of goods drives the price 
above competitive levels. This results in supra-competitive profits for the 
monopolist and reduced efficiency because “consumer demands are satis-
fied at a higher cost than necessary.”113 Lack of competition creates ineffi-
ciency in the marketplace, which harms society as a whole. 
Workable competition falls into the final of the three models of com-
petition: oligopoly.114 The oligopoly model most accurately reflects the 
reality of the market, as it concerns the “interaction between a limited 
number of firms.”115 The oligopoly model is of most use to determining 
what economic functions competition law regimes should seek to achieve, 
because the model recognizes restraints that perfect competition ignores 
and, unlike the monopoly model, oligopoly recognizes that most markets 
involve multiple firms engaged in the competitive process. Therefore, 
“[t]he discussion of oligopoly models ... helps address what outcomes one 
can reasonably expect effective competition to achieve.”116 
Accepting the uses of the three economic models, and how they can 
indicate what is achievable by regulation in order to foster workable com-
                                                 
107 MONTI, supra note 36, at 55. 
108 See id. 
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petition, has resulted in economists taking a structural view of the market-
place.117 That is to say that economists came to believe that the structure 
of the marketplace will determine how firms behave; for example, compe-
tition laws should concern themselves with ensuring that markets do not 
become concentrated or that high barriers to entry are not established.118 
This structural framework was developed by the Harvard School and is 
known as the “Market Structure-Conduct-Performance” Framework (or 
SCP).119 The Chicago School criticized the SCP framework, finding the 
SCP too interventionist, and arguing that more reliance should be placed 
on the self-correcting forces of competition, rather than regulatory inter-
vention based on the structure of the marketplace.120 In spite of its dispa-
ragement, the Chicago School was unsuccessful in ridding economic 
thinking of the SCP framework. Current post-Chicago analysis, however, 
recognizes that market structure is potentially anticompetitive, but also 
recognizes that this is just the starting point of any investigation into the 
market, not the be-all and end-all.121 In order to determine anticompetitive 
effects, market structure must be considered in conjunction with firm 
behavior and firm performance (such as product innovation or the devel-
opment of more efficient production methods). 
C. Market Definition 
Given that it has now been established that discovering anticompeti-
tive behavior requires examining the relevant marketplace, it is worth 
briefly considering how competition law defines the relevant market. The 
market can be defined in three ways: (1) the relevant product; (2) geo-
graphic extent; and, possibly, (3) the temporal extent. 
The product market is defined in terms of “interchangeability,” as con-
firmed by the European Court of Justice in Continental Can.122 Interchan-
geability is the extent to which goods are transposable with alternative 
products.123 What interchangeability seeks to discover is whether bananas 
                                                 
117 See RICHARD E. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, 
PERFORMANCE 17 (7th ed. 1992). 
118 See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American 
Manufacturing, 1936–1940, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293, 309, 323 (1951). 
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COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 270 (2001). 
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(for example) form a unique market of themselves or if bananas are just 
part of a broader fresh fruit market.124 To identify the relevant product 
market, the SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in 
Price) is used.125 What the SSNIP test tries to answer is whether the cus-
tomers of a manufacturer would switch to alternative products as a result 
of a hypothetical, small (roughly five to ten percent), permanent increase 
in price.126 If consumers would switch to the alternative products as a 
result of the price increase, then the alternatives are included in the prod-
uct market definition.127 Essentially, what the SSNIP test is seeking to 
determine is whether alternative products or services “generate a competi-
tive restraint” on the product in question; if the alternatives do exercise 
such a restraint, then they form part of the relevant market.128 
Defining the relevant geographic market can also be discovered by us-
ing the SSNIP test; for example, would the hypothetical increase in price 
result in consumers looking further afield in order to buy alternative prod-
ucts? In many situations, however, the geographic market can be defined 
more simply because some products are capable of being supplied 
throughout the EU or even the world, whereas there are “technical, legal 
or practical reasons”129 why some products have a more limited market. 
There are also other reasons why a geographic market is limited to nation-
al boundaries or less, such as: “[P]references for national brands, lan-
guage, culture and life style, and the need for a local presence.”130 
Taken together, the relevant product and geographic markets attempt 
to demonstrate how many products make up the relevant market and how 
far the market for those products spreads. There is a third possible type of 
market definition, which is the temporal market.131 Whish suggests that 
markets can grow or contract depending on the time of year.132 The ques-
tion of temporal markets was not dealt with by the ECJ in United 
Brands,133 although the Commission did accept that a temporal market for 
oil exists, following OPEC’s decision to raise prices in the 1970s.134 
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D. Market Power 
The purpose of the above discussion is all a preamble to the real con-
cern of competition law: the “problems which may result from a firm or 
firms possessing market power.”135 Market power is the situation whereby 
the “constraints of competitive forces”136 have broken down; as such, the 
firm(s) possessing market power can raise prices above the competitive 
level “in a profitable way.”137 A firm, or firms, exercising market power 
can cause a similarly negative impact as a monopolist, because they are 
capable of reducing output and limiting consumer choice.138 
The basis for market power is that a firm, or firms, can reduce their 
output, and as such make profits at a supra-competitive level. There are 
various factors that create the necessary conditions to exercise market 
power, including possessing a high market share of over fifty percent.139 
Under Article 102 TFEU, a high degree of market share is described as 
holding a “dominant position,” and the ECJ has held that a market share of 
fifty percent or more may well indicate dominance, or market power, in 
relation to Article 102.140 The presumption of market power where the 
firm has a large market share “has affinities with the SCP paradigm.”141 
Bishop and Walker lists other factors that might be relevant to an assess-
ment of market power, such as: “[B]arriers to entry and potential competi-
tion; barriers to expansion; countervailing buyer power; ... and the nature 
of the oligopolistic interaction between firms.”142 
The economic principle that determines if firms are capable of exercis-
ing market power is price elasticity of demand.143 Price elasticity of de-
mand is the ratio of the percentage decrease in sales resulting from a given 
percentage increase in price. 
144  
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In a market where there is a high elasticity, an increase in price will 
lead to a decrease in overall profits. This is because the profit accruing 
from a smaller amount of goods being sold at a higher price will not ex-
ceed the profit that was generated by selling a larger quantity of goods at 
the original price. Market power is more likely to occur where demand is 
inelastic, because an increase in price will not result in a large drop in 
sales. 
The elasticity of demand for the firm’s products will be influenced by 
the competitive constraints upon the firm.145 For instance, a firm with a 
large market share in a market where there is limited buyer power and 
high barriers to entry is likely to have inelastic demand because there is no 
viable alternative; accordingly, the firm can raise prices at will. Whereas a 
firm in the opposite situation—in other words, with a lower market share, 
strong buyers and low barriers to entry—will have a high elasticity of 
demand and therefore cannot exercise market power. 
Market power is an evil that competition law seeks to prevent by pro-
moting workable competition. The foregoing consideration of economics 
and competition law might suggest that preventing the abuse of market 
power is the final, or ultimate, aim of competition. This is not the case, 
however, as will be discussed in Part III below.146 
III. THE AIMS OF COMPETITION LAW 
“[A]ll competition decisions are subject to political debate.”
147
 
As Bork famously stated, competition law cannot be understood until 
it is determined, “[w]hat is the point of the law—what are its goals?”148 In 
trying to answer that question, a ceaseless argument, “an evergreen ‘old’ 
debate,”149 continues to this day. Some scholars suggest that there is now 
“a rough consensus on certain—but not all—core antitrust principles.”150 
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However, others argue that there is “no consensus.”151 Accordingly, the 
“battle for the soul of antitrust”152 still rages. 
In order to understand the competition law of the European Union, a 
variety of aims of competition law will be considered. First, the aims of 
competition law across the globe will be briefly dealt with, in order to 
demonstrate that no consensus has been reached as to the aims of competi-
tion law. Second, the consumer welfare aim will be discussed, as this is 
recognized as the sole aim of U.S. antitrust law,153 and scholars on both 
sides of the Atlantic have gone to great lengths to argue that consumer 
welfare (or economic efficiency) is the only acceptable goal of competi-
tion law.154 Third, this Article will seek to argue that non-efficiency goals 
can be incorporated into the aims of competition law. Finally, some of the 
non-efficiency aims of competition law will be discussed in turn, namely: 
fairness, freedom, and democracy; the protection of competitors; environ-
mental considerations; employment; and single market integration within 
the European Union. 
A. Global Perspectives on the Aims of Competition Law 
From a global perspective, it is arguable that there is no convergence 
in international competition law. This is because “different systems of 
competition law protect idiosyncratic aims.”155 As such, competition law 
has been used to promote a variety of objectives, including: “regional 
development, to maintain high employment levels, to protect home indus-
try from foreign ownership or domination so allowing the growth of na-
tional champions and to protect industries vital to national military de-
fence.”156 
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This can be explained because “competition law is a function of its 
context.”157 To put it another way, the aims of competition law are deter-
mined by the path dependency of the relevant jurisdiction. Path dependen-
cy is defined as meaning “that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific 
and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it.”158 As such, histo-
ry and ideology matter,159 because when it comes to competition law, “a 
jurisdiction’s prevailing political mood—informed by history, culture, and 
its view of others’ success— ... gives specificity to ... policy decisions.”160 
As Furse writes: “Different regimes have emerged at different times and in 
response to different pressures.”161 For instance, Korean competition law 
was introduced partly in order to correct distortions that had occurred in 
the economy “due to the government-led rapid economic growth.”162 
Owing to the weight of path dependency, it is hardly surprising that 
there is not a unified global goal for competition law. However, the OECD 
has noted that “there appears to be a shift away from use of competition 
laws to promote what might be characterized as broad public interest ob-
jectives.”163 Arguably, the OECD may be overstating this shift away from 
public interest objectives and towards consumer welfare. As will be dis-
cussed below, European Union competition law recognizes multiple 
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aims,164 as does the Canadian Competition Act, including the protection of 
small businesses.165 Furthermore, even in developed nations, unbridled 
free-market competition is not necessarily accepted with enthusiasm. As 
Président Sarkozy of France asked in 2007: “Parce qu’en tant qu’idéol-
ogie, que dogme, qu’a donné la concurrence à l’Europe?”166 
It therefore seems that the aims of the world’s various competition 
laws are diverse and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Despite this, there are calls, even demands, for convergence.167 Competi-
tion has been described as the “one area of the law in which we would 
expect to see pressure toward the creation of a single standard.”168 This 
convergence is inevitably considered to be towards the sole consumer 
welfare standard adopted in the United States, as “advocates of conver-
gence [believe] that jurisdictions should have similar rules and ones that 
should follow those of the U.S.”169 
From one perspective, it is easy to see why the cheerleaders of conver-
gence aspire to push the rest of the world into following the United States’ 
consumer welfare example. The sole aim of the consumer welfare stan-
dard breeds certainty of outcome. In theory, businesspeople are better able 
to predict outcomes when dealing with U.S. antitrust than with EU compe-
tition law. The uncertainty inherent in EU law “primarily result[s] from 
uncertainty as to the purpose ascribed to Union competition law.”170 The 
U.S. antitrust regime, therefore, is considered superior because outcomes 
are more predictable and based on economic analysis; as such, firms are 
better able to plan their future strategies.171 It has been suggested that the 
United States has the most advanced competition law regime in the 
world;172 accordingly, it can therefore be argued that it would be “best 
practice” to adopt the U.S. consumer welfare approach. Finally, it could be 
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argued that the wisdom of adopting a sole consumer welfare goal needs no 
more evidence than the fact that, in 2007, China—the world’s fastest 
growing economy173—“adopted consumer welfare as [the] goal” of its 
competition regime.174 
These arguments for convergence towards a consumer welfare stan-
dard are perhaps not as strong as they first appear. Although not a result of 
adopting a consumer welfare standard, the U.S. system of antitrust litiga-
tion is arguably fraught with risk and uncertainty. In the end, antitrust 
cases “are decided by lay jurors” and “the common use of class action 
lawsuits in the U.S.[ ] makes antitrust cases highly risky for businesses 
sued there.”175 Furthermore, U.S. antitrust law allows for treble damages 
to be awarded against defendants;176 this could potentially be an incentive 
to encourage baseless litigation. While the uncertainties created by issues 
such as jury trials and class action lawsuits are not because of the adoption 
of a consumer welfare standard, these issues do serve to illustrate that U.S. 
antitrust is perhaps not a fount of perfect clarity. 
The sole aim of the consumer welfare goal may well be “best practice” 
in the United States, but that does not necessarily make it so for every 
jurisdiction. This returns us to the issue of path dependency. A consumer 
welfare standard is arguably better suited to “America because of its rela-
tively stronger embrace of capitalism, than in Europe, where socialist and 
ordoliberal thought is much more attractive.”177 What champions of con-
vergence need to understand is that laws need to suit the societal and cul-
tural norms of their jurisdictions. Transplanting law, or the aims of a law, 
from one jurisdiction to another and failing to have regard for these societ-
al and cultural norms is likely to be a recipe for failure. 
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This continued failure to adopt consumer welfare as the sole aim baf-
fles convergence advocates.178 In their article Antitrust Divergence and the 
Limits of Economics, Devlin and Jacobs suggest that: firstly, the EU has 
adopted the sole consumer welfare standard;179 secondly, “European com-
petition law does not fully understand” business practices;180 and finally, 
“a transatlantic chasm ... frustrates efforts to attain international harmoni-
zation”181 (that is, convergence towards the sole aim of consumer welfare). 
Devlin and Jacobs’ first claim that the EU has adopted the sole aim of 
consumer welfare can best be described as wishful thinking by those look-
ing to find evidence of convergence. Although the European Commission 
has made statements to that effect,182 the European Court of Justice expli-
citly rejected that idea in GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission.183 The second 
and third statements are perhaps informed by the belief that, if competition 
law does not serve the same masters as U.S. law, it is fundamentally de-
fective. 
This Articles seeks to demonstrate that, from a global perspective, 
competition law pursues a myriad of aims and there is no sign of conver-
gence. Shenefield has stated that convergence “can never happen; it will 
never happen; and even if it could happen, it would in all probability be a 
bad thing.”184 This is because competition law must “reflect[ ] the current 
inherent socio-economic and cultural values” of their jurisdiction.185 As 
hard as that might be for convergence advocates to appreciate, jurisdic-
tions “should not be subject to criticism in comparison with the competi-
tion laws of countries with different values.”186 What this means is that 
competition regimes can adopt multiple aims, which do not have to be 
related to economic efficiency. However, as consumer welfare is perhaps 
the most prominent goal in competition law, it will be discussed next. 
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B. The Consumer Welfare Standard 
Despite it being clear that consumer welfare has not been universally 
accepted as the sole goal of antitrust, consumer welfare is an important 
goal (or the sole goal) of many competition regimes, including the United 
States and the European Union.187 The significance of consumer welfare 
can therefore not be overstated, particularly when it is recognized as the 
sole goal of U.S. law and a goal of EU law, and these jurisdictions have 
“the most comprehensive and aggressively enforced antitrust laws in the 
world.”188 
In a sense, consumer welfare is just a short hand for economic effi-
ciency, although it is a form seeking to maximize economic efficiency that 
prefers the consumer to the producer.189 However, in the end, “maximising 
consumer welfare and maximising social welfare give the same result.”190 
Bork defines consumer welfare as being “another term for the wealth of 
the nation.”191 For those who subscribe wholeheartedly to the consumer 
welfare goal, the promotion of economic efficiency is “the only goal of 
antitrust law.”192 
The general benefit that is accrued from having consumer welfare as 
the aim of competition law is that the consumer welfare standard “is the 
best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good quality products at 
the lowest possible prices.”193 As consumer welfare reduces prices and 
improves product quality, this has led to suggestions that the consumer 
welfare aim benefits the poorest members of society: “[I]t is notable that 
antitrust enforcement generally serves to help those at the low end of the 
income distribution range without decreasing efficiency.... [P]rices will be 
made lower in this market so that for any given income, however low, a 
larger basket of goods and services can be purchased.”194 As mentioned 
previously,195 consumer welfare is also believed to contribute to certainty 
of outcomes. This is because the consumer welfare standard is based on 
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economic analysis, unlike “nebulous social goals,”196 meaning that busi-
nesspeople can better determine if their firms are involved in activities that 
competition authorities are likely to consider anticompetitive.197 
Therefore, there are benefits to adopting the consumer welfare stan-
dard. As such, it is worthwhile considering why consumer welfare was 
initially adopted in the United States; after all, consumer welfare was not 
the original goal of U.S. antitrust law.198 Consumer welfare advocates 
argue that consumer welfare is a better aim for competition law than other 
goals because the consumer welfare standard produces results based on 
economic analysis,199 whereas the other potential aims of competition law 
are liable to be influenced by changing political considerations.200 
However, the consumer welfare standard was the product of political 
ideology.201 The Sherman Act never specified what the aims of America’s 
antitrust regime should be.202 Accordingly, it fell to the courts to decide 
those aims, and the courts settled on adopting an economic approach to 
antitrust.203 An economic approach does not instinctively make consumer 
welfare a value-free approach to enforcing competition law. The adoption 
of consumer welfare, it is argued by Hughes, was the specific intent of the 
Reagan Administration, which 
pluck[ed] from academia many of the most articulate spokesmen for 
the Chicago School approach and install[ed] them on the courts of ap-
peals. The new judges, including Bork on the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook on the 
Seventh Circuit, began to write opinions reflecting the Chicago ap-
proach, including the view that consumer welfare should be the exclu-
sive focus of the law.204 
Therefore, the consumer welfare standard is a not a value-free ap-
proach; while its reliance on economic analysis potentially might produce 
greater certainty, the consumer welfare approach is an approach driven by 
those who believe in the self-correcting abilities of the free-market. As 
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such, the consumer welfare standard is more likely to reward or exempt 
behavior of which its creators approve. For instance, the Chicago School 
applauds potentially “morally repugnant” behavior, such as “an efficient 
firm using any means at its disposal to drive a less efficient firm out of 
business.”205 It can therefore be argued that the consumer welfare standard 
is not an instinctively “better” aim for competition law than any other 
standard, it simply happens to be the winner of the argument in the United 
States, and to the victor go the spoils. 
Consumer welfare became of increasing significance to the competi-
tion law of the European Union/Community from the beginning of the 
twenty-first century onwards,206 although consumer choice and “consum-
ers’ advantage” were considered decisive by the Commission as far back 
as 1991.207 The European Commission has made repeated statements to 
the effect that consumer welfare is now the sole goal of EU competition 
law.208 However, the European Court of Justice has singularly failed to 
recognize it as such, most recently in GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission: 
[I]t must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other com-
petition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to pro-
tect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the 
structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.209 
Further, the Commission may now be backing away from their posi-
tion of holding up consumer welfare as the sole goal of competition law. 
The latest Guidelines released by the Commission do not mention either 
consumer welfare or economic efficiency, and instead the Commission 
merely states a purpose of “ensur[ing] that effective competition is main-
tained.”210 
Consumer welfare is therefore established as a sole goal of competi-
tion in the United States, and a goal of competition in the EU, China,211 
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Canada212 and Australia213 (to name but a few). Consumer welfare is now 
so well-established that Whitman has written: “The primacy of consumer 
economic interest has come to seem so self-evident that it hardly requires 
any effort at justification.”214 Somewhat mockingly, Hughes describes 
such statements as “a Möbius strip of rationalization” for justifying and 
defending the consumer welfare standard.215 
This blinkered assumption of the perfection of the consumer welfare 
standard does not conceal the fact that criticism can be leveled against it. 
Consumer welfare artificially divides individuals into two distinct catego-
ries: consumers and producers,216 but in reality, individuals are both: 
“When a worker works, he is a producer; when he shops, he is a consum-
er.”217 As such, the consumer and producer distinction is not a clear one, 
particularly because large public firms “are owned by shareholders,”218 
therefore the consumer welfare standard may give to the individual when 
he or she is a consumer, but take away from him or her when the individu-
al is a producer or shareholder. It is because consumer welfare makes this 
artificial distinction that it fails to appreciate that a sole consumer welfare 
standard could actually be damaging to individuals. As Motta explains, the 
consumer welfare standard may benefit the individual when that individu-
al is acting as a consumer but will not produce an overall benefit for the 
individual: 
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[I]n today’s advanced economies consumers often own firms (partly or 
fully), directly or through pension and investment funds. Accordingly, 
dividends are distributed to a vast number of citizens who would be 
hurt if profits were reduced. If the adoption of a consumer welfare 
standard were intended to favour “citizens” as opposed to “firms,” it 
would not be clear that such a goal would be achieved. Second, if one 
took literally the objective of maximising consumer surplus, this would 
lead to pricing at marginal costs, with firms exiting the industry in the 
long-run or having to be subsidised to cover fixed costs .... Third, and 
of great importance, lower prices and profits would have the effect of 
depriving firms from the necessary incentives to innovate, invest, and 
introduce new products.219 
As such, there does seem to be a persuasive argument that consumer 
welfare should not be the be-all and end-all when it comes to competition 
policy, as it only accounts for benefits to individuals when they are con-
sumers. This issue goes to the heart of the matter that this Article seeks to 
answer. Consumer welfare needs to be balanced with matters that are also 
of collective concern to individuals and society as a whole, such as em-
ployment or environmental protection. 
The consumer welfare standard and economic efficiency have been 
beneficial in defining the goals of competition law, but, like perfect com-
petition, they remain just theories. Like all theories, consumer welfare 
does not survive contact with reality. Clearly consumer welfare has an 
important role to play, but it is neither the “‘correct’ position” nor the “last 
word” in the aims of competition law.220 If consumer welfare is not ba-
lanced against non-efficiency goals in the application of competition law, 
then the results could well be harmful to society as a whole. 
C. Incorporating Non-Efficiency Goals into Competition Law as a Gener-
al Proposition 
The sole consumer welfare standard represents one end of the spec-
trum regarding the aims of competition law. At the other end of the spec-
trum is the view “that competition policy is based on multiple values that 
cannot be reduced to a single economic goal,” and that these values must 
“reflect society’s wishes, culture, history, institutions and perception of 
itself.”221 This “multiple values” view of the aims of competition law is a 
reflection of jurisdictional path dependency; as Townley states: “[L]aw 
(and more importantly legal interpretation) is founded in country and cul-
                                                 
219 MOTTA, supra note 33, at 21. 
220 Shenefield, supra note 63, at 403. 
221 TOWNLEY, supra note 83, at 1. 
88 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:059 
 
ture.”222 Dabbah lists various “social goals or values” including: (1) pro-
tecting small businesses, (2) protection of democracy, and (3) market 
fairness.223 This section seeks to demonstrate that a more holistic approach 
to the aims of competition law, which incorporates non-efficiency goals, is 
necessary in order for competition law to benefit society. 
If it is accepted that competition law should have multiple aims, the 
question then becomes what aims should be included? Bork writes that 
competition regimes that include multiple aims are “likely to leave the 
impression that antitrust is a cornucopia of social values, all of them rather 
vague and undefined but infinitely attractive.”224 Dabbah divides the aims 
of competition law into three general categories: economic goals, social 
goals, and broader political goals.225 Although consumer welfare advo-
cates would like to do so, social goals and broader political goals cannot 
be rendered as automatically inapplicable as concerns of competition law. 
The aims that should be included in a competition regime arguably need to 
be determined by each jurisdiction in order to be in keeping with the goals 
and values of that society. For instance, the European Union has, since its 
inception, used competition law as a way to prevent distortions in the 
internal market, in other words, as a means for promoting market integra-
tion.226 As such, there can be no “one size fits all” guide to what aims 
competition regimes should incorporate. What this Article seeks to argue 
is that it seems clear that competition law should not merely aim at hitting 
a consumer welfare target—with the possible exception of the United 
States, where it appears that consumer welfare has laid down deep juri-
sprudential and intellectual roots and, accordingly, has become part of that 
jurisdiction’s path dependency. 
There are two arguments against incorporating non-efficiency values 
into competition. First, values other than efficiency can create uncertain 
outcomes or “fundamentally alter the final outcome”227 of an investigation 
into allegedly anticompetitive conduct. This has previously been dis-
cussed.228 The second issue is whether non-efficiency aims are appropriate 
to be considered as part of a competition law analysis.229 Odudu questions 
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the legitimacy of incorporating non-efficiency goals into competition 
law.230 In Odudu’s opinion, using competition law to “coerce virtues”231 is 
undemocratic because such non-efficiency objectives should “be pursued 
through democratic, political, legislative routes.”232 In support of his posi-
tion, Odudu points to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of National Society 
of Professional Engineers v. United States.233 In National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers, Justice Stevens ruled that: 
[T[he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately com-
petition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and 
services. “The heart of our national economic policy long has been 
faith in the value of competition.” ... Even assuming occasional excep-
tions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy 
precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or 
bad.234 
However, Justice Stevens is misstating the law. The Sherman Act does 
not list the aims of U.S. antitrust law. The consumer welfare aim was a 
creation of the courts, who were building on the intellectual foundations 
provided by Robert Bork.235 Therefore, Odudu’s argument falls short. If 
Odudu can accept that judges interpret competition statutes (which are 
silent on the aims of competition law) to make consumer welfare the sole 
aim of competition law, then there is no reason he cannot accept judges 
interpreting statutes to give competition laws different aims. This is par-
ticularly true of the European Union, as Article 7 TFEU insists that there 
is “consistency between [the Union’s] policies and activities.”236 As such, 
as is argued in greater detail below,237 the EU’s competition law must 
consider aims other than consumer welfare. Including aims other than 
consumer welfare is not a “usurpation of democracy,”238 but rather, it is an 
acknowledgement that competition law is part of a broader regulatory 
framework; as such, competition law needs to work towards the same aims 
as other laws that govern industrial policy. 
Furthermore, Odudu’s argument is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, 
consumer welfare advocates believe that focusing exclusively on consum-
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er welfare competition regimes “increase[s] welfare for the society as a 
whole”239—in other words, that an efficient market will promote overall 
welfare. Therefore, consumer welfare advocates assume that by aiming for 
the goal of maximizing consumer welfare, this will generate non-
efficiency benefits, such as consumer protection, promotion of employ-
ment, and others. The issue is that consumer welfare alone cannot benefit 
society as a whole. Despite Kroes’ arguments to the contrary,240 it is irra-
tional to suggest that non-efficiency goals can be incidentally promoted 
through exclusion. In order to promote the multiple outcomes that benefit 
society as a whole, all these aims must be considered together in a holistic 
analysis. 
This leads to the second flaw in Odudu’s argument, that such benefits 
are arguably not “Townley’s values”241 but universal values. Although 
some of Townley’s more extreme examples include using competition law 
to discourage binge drinking,242 for the most part non-efficiency goals are 
not extremist viewpoints. For instance, Article 9 TFEU requires that, “the 
Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a 
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the 
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health.”243 Is Odudu suggesting that the majority of 
citizens in a democracy are opposed to promoting employment or educa-
tion? This author would submit that the answer is almost certainly not. 
These are non-efficiency concerns that are arguably valid and widely ac-
cepted by members of a democratic society. 
In order for competition law to function effectively, it needs to balance 
broader aims against consumer welfare, otherwise competition law will 
continue to be “out of whack.”244 To work towards improving society as a 
whole and raising living standards, competition cannot be “only about the 
survival of the fittest but also about the protection of the weak and the 
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pursuit of important social goals.”245 To balance consumer welfare with 
other objectives within competition law, this Article proposes a stakehold-
er theory of competition law. A stakeholder in a business is defined as: “A 
person who has an interest in a business or enterprise, though not neces-
sarily as an owner.”246 In terms of a stakeholder theory of competition law, 
this would involve encompassing multiple aims that take into considera-
tion the needs of businesses, employees, and the concerns of society as a 
whole (for example, environmental protection, et cetera). Accordingly, the 
aims of competition law should represent a coalition of interests and the 
involvement of all relevant participants. As Stucke puts it: “[R]ejoice 
when different stakeholders actively participate in shaping the objectives 
of competition policy. One does not develop a competition culture by 
cutting off the debate and entrusting policy to the experts. Such fiat is a 
recipe for disaster.”247 As such, it seems clear that competition law needs 
not only a soul, but also a heart. A competition law regime should not 
function just on the basis of economic analysis, but should also consider 
virtues that help protect and promote the living standards and quality of 
life of a jurisdiction’s citizens. Consumer welfare does not go the whole 
way towards achieving that end; non-efficiency aims must be incorpo-
rated. 
D. Fairness, Freedom, and Democracy 
Fairness, freedom, and the promotion and defense of democracy 
through competition law can largely be traced back to the German Frei-
burg School.248 The Freiburg School developed a philosophy “based on 
the values of personal liberty and equality.”249 From an ordoliberal pers-
pective, “freedom is the ultimate goal” of competition law.250 
Freedom is the most fundamental goal of competition law for ordoli-
berals.251 Economic freedom is closely linked with the protection of fair-
ness and democracy because “the protection of individual freedom of 
action ... restrain[s] undue economic power.”252 By restraining over-
                                                 
245 Albors-Llorens, supra note 155, at 311. 
246 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (9th ed. 2009). 
247 Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 1008 
(2008). 
248 See, e.g., ODUDU, supra note 27, at 14–17; Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-
Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 273 (2009). 
249
 MONTI, supra note 36, at 24. 
250 ODUDU, supra note 27, at 16. 
251 Id. 
252 Akman, supra note 248, at 273. 
92 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:059 
 
whelming economic power, “individuals are free to participate”253 in mar-
kets and are given ample opportunity to seek their own role in society. 
Economic freedom was held to be an aim of U.S. antitrust law; in North-
ern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States the Supreme Court stated: “The 
Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition.”254 
The aim of economic freedom has come in for criticism because, in 
order to ensure the economic freedom demanded by ordoliberals, it would 
require the destruction of all contractual relationships.255 This problem 
with the economic freedom aim, if taken to its logical extreme, has been 
highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court.256 As Justice Brandeis pointed 
out, “[e]very agreement concerning trade ... restrains. To bind, to restrain, 
is of their very essence.”257 Accordingly, U.S. antitrust law only prohibits 
“unreasonable restraint[s] of trade.”258 
As such, economic freedom is not without its flaws. If total economic 
freedom was achieved, it would lead to anarchy in the marketplace; how-
ever, freedom does inform the thinking behind the non-efficiency goals of 
fairness and democracy. Fairness will be considered first. Fairness is 
linked to freedom since it stems “from our beliefs in free will, responsi-
bility, autonomy, [and] equality.”259 Hughes believes that “fairness is a 
ratifying process” in that “[t]he competitors who achieve success thereby 
prove that they deserve it.”260 Fairness requires “firms to behave in a cer-
tain way both with respect to customers and to rivals,”261 meaning that 
firms cannot resort to unprincipled tactics in order to compete in the mar-
ketplace. The main examples of unfair conduct are predatory pricing and 
refusal to supply (in some circumstances). 
Predatory pricing is when a dominant firm, or group of firms, “reduces 
prices to a loss-making level” in order to discipline or drive a competitor 
out of the marketplace.262 Once the competitor has ceased to be a threat, 
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the dominant firm will then raise prices above competitive levels.263 Pre-
datory pricing may be unfair to competitors, but arguably promotes con-
sumer welfare by lowering prices: “[C]utting prices in order to increase 
business often is the very essence of competition.”264 Given the potential 
benefits of predatory pricing to consumers, both the U.S. Supreme 
Court265 and the Privy Council (for New Zealand)266 have held that, in 
order to prove predatory pricing is harmful, evidence must be presented 
that the dominant firm is capable of recouping the losses incurred through 
predatory pricing in the long run. However, the ECJ has taken a compara-
tively harsh view towards identifying conduct as predatory pricing: in 
AKZO v. Commission the Court made clear that firms engaged in predato-
ry pricing would be punished.267 Furthermore, the ECJ does not require 
proof that the dominant firm is able to recoup its losses in order to prove 
predatory pricing.268 Predatory pricing can be seen as falling within the 
consumer welfare paradigm; if predatory pricing successfully forces com-
petitors out of the market, then the remaining firm(s) can raise prices to 
supra-competitive. However, prohibitions against predatory pricing are 
more about fairness than consumer welfare. It is unfair to force competi-
tors out of the marketplace by driving them out of business with artificial-
ly low prices, therefore denying them their economic freedom to partici-
pate in the marketplace. 
Refusal to supply is restricted to limited sets of circumstances and, for 
the most part, contract law does not insist upon “compulsory dealing.”269 
One situation where refusal to supply offends principles of fairness, and is 
therefore prohibited, is refusing to supply an existing customer with a 
necessary raw material when that customer is also a competitor in a down-
stream market, and the raw material is necessary to manufacture the 
downstream product.270 Similarly, an unfair refusal to supply occurs when 
“a powerful firm permit[s] rivals to compete and prosper ... and then 
pull[s] the rug out.”271 Such a situation occurred in Aspen Skiing,272 where 
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the dominant firm originally allowed its competitor (both firms operated 
ski facilities in the same region) to engage in a joint marketing scheme and 
a ticketing system where customers could buy passes that could be used at 
either facility. However, when the competitor started prospering, the do-
minant firm cancelled the agreement.273 Like predatory pricing, these 
instances of refusal to supply demonstrate when competition law takes 
fairness into account—when conduct crosses a line and ceases to be rigor-
ous competition and instead becomes abusive. This unfair behavior im-
pinges upon the economic freedom of individuals by not giving that indi-
vidual a reasonable opportunity to function in the marketplace. The 
individual’s economic freedom is crushed by more powerful, or dominant, 
actors. This crushing of individual economic freedom damages not only 
the individual concerned, but also the relevant market, and society as a 
whole. 
The abuse of dominance is most clearly seen (from an economic free-
dom perspective) by the use of competition laws to protect democracy 
itself. Judge Learned Hand called “great industrial consolidations ... inhe-
rently undesirable.”274 This is because great economic power, when linked 
with “anti-competitive conduct ... is incompatible with democracy.”275 For 
instance, following World War II, the United States introduced competi-
tion laws into Germany and Japan in order to “diffuse centers of power” 
that might otherwise “be marshalled behind [resurgent] authoritarian re-
gimes.”276 This comes from a general fear that freedom and democracy are 
“put at risk when a few citizens and groups dominate a large share of re-
sources.”277 An example of such economic power influencing political 
decisions is found in modern-day Hong Kong, where business interests 
have used their influence to ensure that the Hong Kong government op-
poses “domestic or international legislation on competition.”278 Wilkinson 
and Pickett note that: 
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[H]alf of the world’s largest economies are multinationals, and that 
General Motors is bigger than Denmark, that DaimlerChrysler is bigger 
than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell bigger than Venezuela, and Sony big-
ger than Pakistan. Like the aristocratic ownership of huge tracts of land, 
which in 1791 Tom Paine attacked in his The Rights of Man, these pro-
ductive assets remain effectively in the hands of a very few, very rich 
people, and make our claims to real democracy look pretty thin.279 
It is clear that competition law can play a much wider role than mere 
economic efficiency, particularly given the immense economic clout 
wielded by multinational corporations. Competition law can be used to 
safeguard our rights to engage in economic activity and our system of 
government. 
E. The Protection of Competitors 
Using competition law to protect competitors fits in well with ordoli-
beral thought, as protecting competitors is arguably a method to prevent 
dominant firms from wielding too much power and potentially limiting the 
economic freedom of other actors. Motta states that the defense of small 
firms is “one of the main reasons behind the adoption of competition 
laws.”280 In line with an ordoliberal justification for the protection of com-
petitors, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: 
[I]t is not for the real prosperity of any country that ... changes should 
occur which result in transferring an independent business man, the 
head of his establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant 
or agent of a corporation for selling the commodities which he once 
manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the business poli-
cy of the company and bound to obey orders issued by others.281 
The protection of competitors is also in keeping with the SCP frame-
work.282 By protecting competitors, the structure of the market is pro-
tected, thus preventing a firm from achieving a dominant position. For 
instance, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that the role of U.S. antitrust law was the “protection of competi-
tion, not competitors.”283 However, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the 
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best way “to promote competition [is] through the protection of viable, 
small, locally owned businesses.”284 Brown Shoe was one of many cases 
during the 1960s in which the Warren Court protected small firms in order 
to protect the competitive process.285 It is because of this that the argument 
has been advanced that protecting competitors is the same as protecting 
competition itself, as “an effort to protect competitors includes protecting 
competition”286—after all, “competition requires competitors.”287 The ECJ 
has also noted that it is sometimes difficult to separate the protection of 
competitors “from the maintenance of an effective competitive struc-
ture.”288 
In addition to protecting the structure of the market, other benefits that 
potentially accrue from the protection of competitors are innovation and 
promotion of local businesses.289 According to Motta: “The European 
Commission seems to have taken the view that small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are more dynamic, more likely to innovate and more 
likely to create employment than large firms. This would be an additional 
argument to promote SMEs. However, the empirical evidence is quite 
ambiguous.”290 The possibility of smaller competitors being more innova-
tive is an economic efficiency goal, whereas the promotion of competitors 
to protect local firms is a non-efficiency goal. There is a current of thought 
that local businesses, being part of the local community, will be more 
likely to serve broader goals, such as promoting a high level of employ-
ment.291 As Justice Douglas memorably stated in defense of localism: 
“Control of American business is being transferred from local communi-
ties to distant cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets 
and profit and loss statements before them decide the fate of communities 
with which they have little or no relationship.”292 An example of the pro-
tection of local firms from the encroachment of larger national or multina-
tional competitors is the French “zone de chalandise,” the purpose of 
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which is “to guarantee that small butchers and bakers will not face ruinous 
competition from large-square-footage stores.”293 
Despite these potential benefits flowing from the protection of compet-
itors, this aim faces considerable criticisms.294 Williams describes the 
protection of competitors as a “political slogan” in defense of the “little 
guy,” “but bad economics.”295 The main criticism of the protection of 
competitors is that, as an aim, it is not economically efficient.296 Protecting 
smaller firms leads to inefficient allocation of resources and undermines 
the competitive process; by shielding smaller firms from their larger and 
more successful rivals, large firms are denied their “economies of scale in 
a market” which allow these large firms the ability to compete in the most 
effective manner.297 A non-efficiency criticism of the protection of com-
petitors is somewhat darker in its nature; essentially, that the protection of 
small firms finds its roots in anti-Semitic opposition to Jewish owned 
chain-stores in pre-World War II Europe.298 Despite the inevitable criti-
cism that the protection of competitors is not economically efficient, ar-
guments could be advanced that small, locally-owned businesses are as 
important to a society’s well-being as vast multi-national conglomerates. 
Given that smaller firms are likely to be more fragile than large competi-
tors, there is an argument to be made that SMEs deserve a special measure 
of protection. 
F. Protecting the Environment through Competition Law 
Despite not being economically efficient, the aims of economic free-
dom and the protection of competitors are established goals of competition 
law regimes.299 Using competition law for environmental concerns is a 
relatively new concept. Environmental concerns have been used by the 
European Commission to permit conduct that would otherwise have been 
considered anticompetitive.300 The Commission has not directly stated that 
environmental concerns are enough to trump competition; the closest the 
Commission has come to this is allowing an agreement on the basis that it 
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“gives direct practical effect to environmental objectives.”301 However, the 
Commission has primarily sought to justify the inclusion of environmental 
concerns on the basis of “economic progress”302 or economic efficiency.303 
Thus, the Commission is attempting to subsume environmental issues into 
the consumer welfare standard. For instance, in the Philips-Osram deci-
sion, the Commission noted that a reduction in air pollution created “direct 
and indirect benefits for consumers.”304 
Integrating environmental concerns into the consumer welfare stan-
dard can be justified because “consumers do not properly take into ac-
count all the externalities involved in their purchase and consumption 
decisions.”305 This stance was specifically taken by the Commission in 
CECED.306 Essentially, the Commission has directly equated environmen-
tal concerns with economic efficiency.307 Monti describes this method of 
analysis as “remarkable.”308 From a consumer welfare perspective, it is 
hard to understand why consumer choice should be limited because of 
environmental concerns; a purist of the Chicago School would not ap-
prove. Of course, from a total or social welfare perspective, the Philips-
Osram, CECED, and DSD decisions could be justified because, in the long 
run, society as a whole reduces costs by preventing environmental damage 
(rather than paying to repair it). However, this author would submit that 
environmental protection is just another public policy, or non-efficiency, 
aim for competition law. The Commission should seek to clarify its posi-
tion, and state that it does consider non-efficiency aims, such as the envi-
ronment, rather than dishonestly attempting to shoehorn these aims into 
the consumer welfare standard. 
G. Promoting Employment 
Promoting a high level of employment is, like environmental protec-
tion, a public policy goal that contributes to the total welfare of society. 
Given that “[c]ompetition ... is not an ultimate goal in itself, but rather an 
instrument to enhance the welfare of people,”309 then arguably one of the 
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most important roles for competition law should be promoting and sustain-
ing a high level of employment. Without discussing the importance given 
to employment (or the environment for that matter) under the TFEU, 
which will be discussed below,310 there are compelling reasons for accept-
ing the consideration of employment in competition law analysis. If com-
petition law benefits the individual as a consumer, should it not also seek 
to benefit the individual when he or she is functioning as a producer? 
The Commission and the European courts have considered employ-
ment issues to be a valid part of competition law analysis, even if this is 
not always clear.311 In Ford/Volkswagen the Commission noted that a joint 
venture would create “about 5,000 jobs and indirectly create up to another 
10,000 jobs.”312 However, the Commission then went on to state that this 
was not “enough to make an exemption possible.”313 The Court of First 
Instance confirmed that the Commission had only considered the em-
ployment benefits of the Ford and Volkswagen joint venture “supereroga-
torily,” and that “the operative part of the decision adopted would have 
been exactly the same” regardless of the jobs created.314 Both European 
institutions insist that job creation was purely incidental to the Commis-
sion’s decision.315 However, Monti states that “many are persuaded that 
the agreement’s impact on employment was a relevant factor.”316 Argua-
bly, it is strange to state in a Commission decision that an agreement will 
lead to job creation, and then go on to state that such a benefit is irrelevant 
to the analysis. 
Although Ford/Volkswagen might arguably be the most opaque deci-
sion in terms of the incorporation of employment considerations into com-
petition law, other European decisions have barely been clearer. For in-
stance, in the Synthetic Fibres317 and Stichting Baksteen318 decisions, the 
Commission noted that the parties to the agreement would “endeavour, as 
far as possible, to secure the retraining and redeployment of any labour 
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displaced in the process of restructuring.”319 These decisions suggest that, 
“the agreements might not have been approved” without “measures de-
signed to soften the blow on employment;” however, this is not forth-
rightly stated.320 In Metro-SB-Grossmärkte v. Commission, the ECJ held 
that “the provision of employment” was one of the factors that “may” be 
considered under Article 101(3),321 meaning that an agreement which is 
considered anticompetitive under Article 101(1) may be exempted under 
101(3) if it has a beneficial impact upon employment. The problem with 
this holding is the use of the word “may.” “May” does not provide clear 
guidance; it suggests only that it is a factor that might be used, meaning 
that employment resides in a grey area being neither excluded nor required 
for consideration. This sort of jurisprudence provides neither clarity nor 
guidance. Of course, as this Article argues below, employment must now 
be considered under the TFEU.322 
The impact of firm conduct upon employment has only produced a li-
mited impression in the United States; perhaps because “labor rights plays 
a far more central role in Europe than in the United States.”323 The one 
area where employment and labor laws meet with competition laws, and 
“trump the competition law ones,” are collective agreements.324 The U.S. 
Supreme Court,325 the ECJ,326 and the Chancery Division of the High 
Court of England and Wales327 have all held that collective bargaining 
arrangements are excluded from competition law. In all the cases cited, 
much the same reasoning was given for excluding collective bargaining 
from the remit of competition law, namely, that allowing competition law 
to intrude into collective bargaining would significantly undermine labor 
rights.328 On the basis of decisions like Ford/Volkswagen and the Metro-
SB-Grossmärkte judgment, it seems that employment considerations have 
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only entered into competition law analysis at the European Union level, 
making employment an almost unique consideration to the EU, although 
Furse states that increasing employment was the original reason behind the 
UK’s competition law.329 It is now time to move on from an almost unique 
consideration of the EU, to the unique consideration of the EU, an aim that 
has truly been the guiding light for EU competition law. 
H. The Role of Competition Law in the Single Market Integration of the 
European Union 
Competition law has been described as “central to the integration 
project,”330 as the European Union has “a fixation on the creation of a 
single EU-wide market.”331 Given the structure of the various treaties, it 
was arguably inevitable that competition law would be imbued with this 
unique mandate.332 As such, in market integration, EU competition law 
has a goal that takes “priority over economic efficiency.”333 
However, Odudu argues that single market integration is an efficiency 
goal: 
A driver for market integration is the realization that firms in isolated 
markets, which concentrate solely on satisfying the demand of their 
home market, cannot exploit efficiency advantages because the mini-
mum efficient scale may greatly exceed national demand. In a larger, 
integrated market, firms have the ability and incentive to specialize, 
improve their technical efficiency, and exploit economies of scale and 
other cost advantages.334 
This is perhaps true, but if so it is an unintended consequence of the 
single market integration goal, rather than the underlying reason for mar-
ket integration. Albors-Llorens better explains why the EU has relied on 
competition law to integrate the single market: 
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The EC Treaty provisions on free movement of goods, persons and ser-
vices are primarily concerned with the removal of barriers that Member 
States might put in place to compartmentalise the territory of the Com-
mon Market along national lines. The removal of these barriers, how-
ever, does not suffice to achieve a unified market. In particular, private 
parties could carry out anti-competitive practices and Member States 
could give artificial competitive advantages to ailing national industries 
or prevent the liberalisation of markets traditionally subject to state 
monopolies. All these activities could effectively divide the Common 
Market. A system ensuring undistorted competition is, therefore, an es-
sential piece in the single market jigsaw.335 
Albors-Llorens’s explanation that competition law was used to pro-
mote and protect market integration is amply demonstrated by case law 
and Commission decisions.336 Consten and Grundig v. Commission337 and 
Italy v. Council launched the relevant line of case law.338 These cases were 
decided on the same day in 1966, and in almost identical language ruled 
that private firms could not “recreate”339 or “restore”340 the barriers be-
tween Member States that the European Union (in its previous incarna-
tions) had sought to abolish. A long line of case law confirms the impor-
tance of market integration in competition law,341 as do Commission 
Decisions342 and Commission Guidelines.343 As such, the primary signi-
ficance of market integration in EU competition law cannot be disputed, 
let alone ignored. There could be an argument for stating that the relative-
ly recent case of Bayer AG344 demonstrates that the ECJ is no longer inter-
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ested in using competition law to pursue the market integration goal. After 
all, the ECJ affirmed the CFI’s judgment in Bayer AG v. Commission.345 
In its judgment, the CFI stated: “[I]t is not open to the Commission to 
attempt to achieve a result, such as the harmonisation of prices in the me-
dicinal products market.”346 This statement by the CFI has been taken as 
evidence of: 
[The CFI’s] hostility to the Commission’s attempt of forcing price 
harmonisation by using competition law. ... [T]he CFI’s pronounce-
ments under Art[icle 101] ... serve as a warning to the Commission 
against its policy of using competition law as a vehicle for bringing 
about forced market integration. Whilst the goal of market integration 
has always been an underlying imperative of [EU] competition law, it 
seems that this goal is no longer to be blindly pursued at the expense of 
all other interests.347 
Although Dawes’ interpretation of the CFI’s judgment in Bayer AG v. 
Commission might be correct, to apply the same interpretation to the 
ECJ’s judgment in Bayer would be to misread the judgment. The ECJ did 
not hold that market integration was no longer an objective of competition 
law, but rather that there had been no violation of competition law because 
an agreement could not be proved (therefore Article 101 did not apply),348 
and, as Bayer was not in a dominant position, Article 102 did not apply.349 
As such, there is no logical reading of Bayer that would suggest that the 
ECJ no longer considers market integration a goal of competition law. The 
aim of single market integration highlights the fact that EU competition 
law operates in a unique environment, distinct from any other in the world. 
That being the case, it is now necessary to consider the framework of EU 
law, of which Article 101 is just a part. 
IV. COMPETITION LAW WITHIN AN EU FRAMEWORK 
The European Union has been described as “a radical experiment in 
the creation of open markets”350 and “represents the most advanced form 
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of regional social and economic integration”351 on the planet. Therefore, 
the EU can justifiably be described as unique. Such a unique organization 
perhaps requires a unique competition regime; after all, the European 
Union’s “structural features are markedly different from the unified single 
market of the United States.”352 As such, in order to understand what func-
tion and role competition law in general, and Article 101 in particular, 
should play means “putting Article [101] in its [Union] context.”353 In 
order to explain the purpose of competition law within an EU framework, 
the following will be discussed: (1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, with particular regard to policy-linking clauses; (2) the 
dispute between the courts and the European Commission over the role of 
Article 101; and (3) the political dimension of European Commission 
decision-making. 
A. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) super-
seded the Treaty establishing the European Community.354 The TFEU 
came into effect on the 1st December 2009, which was the date the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force, following the ratification of the treaty by Ireland 
and the Czech Republic, the last two Member States to do so.355 This was 
in accordance with Article 6(2) of the Lisbon Treaty.356 The TFEU is to be 
read in conjunction with the Treaty on European Union (TEU); both trea-
ties “have the same legal value.”357 The TEU lays out “the mission and 
values of the European Union,”358 whereas the TFEU is more of a func-
tional document (as the name suggests). From a competition perspective 
this is significant because the TEU makes no mention of “competition.”359 
Among the aims of the EU listed in the TEU is that the Union “shall work 
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for the sustainable development of Europe ... aiming at full employ-
ment,”360 meaning that promoting a high level of employment is an aim of 
the EU whereas competition is not. Competition is of course mentioned in 
the TFEU, but, as is argued below, it does appear that competition has 
been downgraded following Lisbon.361 
Before moving on to the impact of Lisbon, it is necessary to consider 
the structure of the TFEU and the impact this has upon the aims of compe-
tition law. Unlike the United States’ Sherman Act, EU competition law is 
not “stand-alone competition legislation aimed at isolated goals, but ... part 
of a web of inter-related Treaty articles.”362 This creates the problem of 
whether the articles of the TFEU relating to competition, Article 101 and 
Article 102, should be read “in isolation” or in conjunction with the TFEU 
as a whole.363 Those who believe in the sole consumer welfare goal for EU 
competition law must argue that Article 101 should be read in isolation 
from the rest of the Treaty because the TFEU insists on the inclusion of 
multiple goals. 
The TFEU creates multiple goals, and the potential for conflict be-
tween these goals comes “through the hierarchy of its articles and due to 
the presence of policy-linking clauses.”364 What Townley means by a 
hierarchy of articles in the Treaties is that not all articles are created equal. 
The top-level aims of the European Union (including the promotion of a 
high level of employment) can be found in Article 3 TEU.365 The require-
ment to promote a high level of employment can also be found in Article 9 
TFEU.366 Another Article that would appear to encourage employment to 
be considered under competition is Article 173(1) TFEU.367 Article 173(1) 
deals with industrial policy and states that “cooperation between undertak-
ings” is to be encouraged, as is “speeding up the adjustment of industry to 
structural changes.”368 Although Article 173(3) goes on to state that the 
Title should not distort competition, it is arguable that 173(1) can be relied 
upon as a basis for exempting an agreement which might otherwise breach 
Article 101(3). 
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Article 173 is a good example of the inherent contradiction within 
areas of EU policy. Townley points out that, “[t]reaty provisions incorpo-
rate conflicting values.”369 Within Article 173 there is a contradiction 
between 173(1) and 173(3). Article 173(1) calls for a system of “competi-
tiveness” that “encourag[es] an environment favourable to cooperation 
between undertakings.”370 But 173(3) states that the Article cannot be 
relied upon to create a “distortion of competition.”371 Article 173(3), it 
should be noted, is also an integration clause: “The Union shall contribute 
to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the 
policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaties.”372 
Article 173 is arguably a good example of the bizarre way that the EU 
Treaties deal with conflicting policy goals: giving with one hand and tak-
ing away with the other. However, perhaps Article 173 is more useful than 
it might at first appear. The Article states that the EU’s system of competi-
tion should take into account industrial policy and allow a system of com-
petition which permits undertakings to cooperate.373 However, such coop-
eration is only to the extent necessary to allow Union industrial policies to 
be achieved, but cartel-like collusion that damages “competition” will be 
prohibited.374 Whether this Article’s interpretation of Article 173 is in fact 
correct will be determined by the European Courts; however, such an 
interpretation would seem to appropriately balance industrial policy 
against the potential negative impact on other EU goals. 
These potentially diverse and conflicting EU aims must be considered 
when applying any other article in either the TEU or the TFEU because of 
policy-linking clauses. These policy-linking clauses, or integration claus-
es, require that the overriding objectives of the EU are taken into account 
by the relevant EU institution whenever a decision is made. The overrid-
ing objectives of the EU are found in Article 3 of the TEU and are listed in 
more detail in Title II of Part One of the TFEU.375 The first article in Title 
II, Article 7, has been described as the “super-integration clause”376 and 
states: “The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and ac-
tivities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the 
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principle of conferral of powers.”377 Article 7 and the remainder of Title II 
can be seen as the “tool[s] for the achievement of ... Treaty objec-
tive[s].”378 What this means is that the integration clauses, as tools to ac-
complish EU objectives, bind together disparate and seemingly uncon-
nected areas of law and policy and ensure that, as a body, they are pointing 
towards a common goal. Therefore, when considering the application of 
Article 101 it is necessary for the Union’s institutions to “take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment.”379 
Relying on Article 9 to integrate employment concerns into Article 101 is 
perhaps particularly pertinent at the present moment. As the Commission 
stated: “[T]he top challenge for the EU today must be to prevent high 
levels of unemployment, to boost job creation and to pave the way for 
economic renewal, sustainable recovery and growth. This will only be 
achieved with stronger cooperation between all stakeholders [and] better 
policy coordination.”380 By making statements concerning the promotion 
of employment and policy coordination, this Article suggests that the 
Commission implicitly recognizes that a concerted effort is called for, and 
such a concerted effort is precisely why the Treaties include integration 
clauses. 
It should be noted that Article 7 was introduced by the Lisbon amend-
ments, but it is not revolutionary. Article 7 can be seen as a codification 
and development of ECJ case law.381 However, what is not clear is the 
legal status of integration clauses. As Schumacher asks, are “integration 
clause[s] merely a political principle or do [they] have legal force?”382 
This author would argue that, given the ECJ’s teleological approach to 
interpreting the Treaties, the integration clauses are not merely policy 
statements but have legal effect.383 
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379 TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 9. 
380 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions - A Shared 
Commitment for Employment, at ¶ 1, COM (2009) 257 final (June 3, 2009), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0257:EN:NO 
T. 
381 See, e.g., Case C-233/94, Fed. Republic of Ger. v. Eur. Parl., 1997 E.C.R. I-2441, 
¶ 48; Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG on the Interpretation of Article 30 of the EC 
Treaty, 2001 E.C.R. I-2159, ¶¶ 76–81. 
382 Schumacher, supra note 378, at 31. 
383 See infra notes 421–38 and accompanying text. 
108 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:059 
 
As such, it seems clear that owing to the policy-linking clauses, Article 
101 “should generally be read so as to incorporate other objectives.”384 
However, this is not a universally accepted view: Odudu seeks to argue 
that policy-linking clauses should not be applied to the competition provi-
sions of the TFEU.385 Odudu’s argument is based on the fact that, as the 
policy-linking clauses create “a positive legal obligation,” it should be 
expected that the clauses would “be expressly invoked in the jurisprudence 
of the Court as justifying consideration of non-efficiency objectives.”386 
Odudu goes on to note that, in relation to competition law, the ECJ has 
singularly failed to do so.387 However, Monti disagrees with Odudu’s 
assessment, and writes: “[T]he European Court of Justice has regularly 
held that the competition rules must be read in the context of the wider 
ambitions of the [Union].”388 The following passages from ECJ judgments 
support Monti’s statement: “[R]estrictions on competition, that are permit-
ted by the Treaty in certain circumstances because the various aims of the 
Treaty must be reconciled with one another,”389 and “the aims of the 
common agricultural policy, whose precedence over the application of the 
Treaty provisions relating to competition is enshrined in the Treaty it-
self.”390 
Of course, there is an argument to be made that both Odudu and Monti 
are correct, in that “non-efficiency objectives” and “the wider ambitions of 
the Union” are not necessarily one and the same.391 This author would 
seek to dispute that statement because the aims of the EU listed in Article 
3 TEU would not be considered efficiency goals by those who advocate a 
consumer welfare/economic efficiency approach to competition law. 
Therefore, although the wording is different, it is submitted that “non-
efficiency objectives” and “the wider ambitions of the Union” can be 
considered analogous. 
As such, it seems clear that the EU competition policy must consider 
more than just consumer welfare, and that the ECJ has recognized that the 
structure of the EU’s treaties demands the consideration of goals other 
than economic efficiency; in short, “competition policy cannot be imple-
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mented in a vacuum, but must be consistent with the development of the 
European project.”392 Essentially, within the EU, “competition policy is 
subservient to other policy objectives.”393 Part of the beauty of the EU 
treaties is that, although they list the aims of the European Union, these 
aims are not ranked at the highest level (despite the hierarchy of articles); 
this is important as it allows the European Union to achieve the “optimal 
balance”394 as priorities shift over time. Gerber is arguably wrong to ex-
press concern over the reduced rule for single market integration; Gerber 
states that, with the EU having almost achieved the goal of a single mar-
ket, competition law “faces fundamental questions about what it is doing 
and why.”395 
So although Gerber is correct in writing: “The creation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community in 1957 began a process of integration in 
which competition law has played a pivotal role, and that process has, in 
turn, imbued competition law with roles and influence far beyond those it 
is likely to have achieved otherwise,”396 that does not mean that single 
integration is, or has to be, the sole goal of European competition law. The 
structure of the TFEU allows aims to change over time to achieve what is 
necessary.397 Now that single market integration is near to completion, that 
does not mean that EU competition law is adrift without its “lodestar;”398 
rather, it means that the EU can now give priority to other objectives. 
What this Article seeks to argue is that the EU, particularly given the cur-
rent global economic climate, should now focus on employment issues. 
This is in order to protect European workers who are potentially under 
threat of losing their jobs as employers seek to lower costs by “relocat[ing] 
production to lower-cost regions.”399 
However, prior to Lisbon, the suggestion was made that, “[o]nce the 
internal market aims are fully achieved, EC competition law might be-
come more independent from the other Treaty provisions and therefore 
less based on principles and more focused on economic analysis.”400 Mon-
ti suggested that the Commission should either “clarify” or “eliminate” the 
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role of non-efficiency goals under Article 101.401 With the ratification of 
Lisbon, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, non-efficiency goals will 
continue to be considered in the EU’s competition laws and the Commis-
sion will have no choice but to continue to consider such goals. 
The most dramatic impact that Lisbon has had on competition law is 
that Article 3(1)(g) EC has no equivalent in the TFEU. Article 3(1)(g) EC 
stated: “[T]he activities of the Community shall include ... a system ensur-
ing that competition in the internal market is not distorted.”402 However, 
Lavrijssen has dismissed the impact of the removal of Article 3(1)(g) EC 
on the importance of competition law as a Union aim.403 Lavrijssen writes 
that: “[C]ompetition policy is explicitly mentioned as a Union competence 
in art. 3(1)(b) TFEU. The latter provision has taken over the function of 
art. 3(1)(g) EC.”404 Therefore, Lavrijssen’s argument is that competition 
has not been downgraded as an EU policy. This argument is less than 
convincing. Article 3(1)(b) TFEU states: “The Union shall have exclusive 
competence in the following areas: ... the establishing of the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.”405 The lan-
guage used in Article 3(1)(b) suggests a downgrading of competition, in 
that competition is now only necessary as far as it is “necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market.”406 It could be suggested that this is a 
very different, and far more limited, goal than the Article 3(1)(g) EC goal 
of ensuring that competition is not distorted. 
Essentially, under the TFEU, competition has been downgraded be-
cause it is not an aim in itself, but is instead subservient to the “function-
ing” of the European Union.407 According to Graupner, the Commission 
has dismissed this revision of language, which has downgraded competi-
tion as “a storm in a teacup.”408 However, given that the European Courts 
“have periodically found it necessary to refer to the [EU]’s objectives 
specifically,”409 it is clearly possible that a change in language could well 
have an impact upon the role of competition in the EU. For instance, in 
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Eco Swiss China Time, the ECJ felt it necessary to refer to Article 3(1)(g) 
EC as underpinning what is now Article 101.410 Continental Can went 
further and described Article 3(1)(g) as “so essential that without it nu-
merous provisions on the treaty would be pointless.”411 
It is important to note that another reference to competition as a Union 
aim is found in Protocol (No. 27), which states: “[T]he internal market as 
set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted.”412 This wording is similar to 
that of Article 3(1)(g) EC; however, the fact that this wording has been 
removed from the Treaty itself and placed in a Protocol is indicative of the 
downgrading of competition as a Union aim, and once again reinforces the 
fact that the Union Courts are likely to give less weight to competition in 
the future when competition is balanced against Union aims that feature in 
Title I, TEU and Title II, TFEU. 
In a recent judgment, the ECJ referred to Protocol (No. 27) as an 
“integral part of the Treaties,”413 which indicates that the Union Courts 
will continue to have regard for the principle that competition should not 
be distorted. This has been taken as evidence that competition has not 
been downgraded as a Union aim.414 Arguably, this reads too much into 
the judgment. In the case before the ECJ, there was no opposing policy 
aim which competition needed to be balanced against. Accordingly, com-
petition could be given free rein; the real test to determine the importance 
of competition in the post-Lisbon Union will come when competition must 
be weighed against the aims laid out in Title I, TEU and Title II, TFEU. 
The other impact of the Lisbon amendments was the expanded role for 
policy-linking clauses.415 Most notable was the inclusion of Article 7 
TFEU,416 “which demands consistency between the Community policies 
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and activities, taking all of the objectives into account.”
417
 As such, Lisbon 
insists upon the recognition of non-efficiency goals in EU competition 
policy.
418
 
B. The Dispute between the Courts and the European Commission over 
the Role of Article 101 
Within the European Union, enforcement of competition law is the re-
sponsibility of the European Commission, specifically the Directorate 
General for Competition, whereas the responsibility for determining the 
ambit of European law falls to the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion.
419
 As such, there is the possibility that the Commission and court will 
clash over the role and function of competition law. This situation is hard-
ly unique. For example, in the United States, the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division enforces federal antitrust law, and the federal courts 
rule on challenges to the legality of the Department of Justice’s actions.
420
 
Essentially, it is not uncommon to divide responsibilities for competition 
law between an administrative agency charged with enforcement and 
judicial oversight being provided by the relevant courts. 
The Commission and courts have come into conflict because the 
Commission has tried to establish a sole consumer goal for competition 
law, which is free of political (that is, non-efficiency) considerations.
421
 
However, the courts have adopted a teleological approach to interpreting 
treaty articles.
422
 Teleological interpretation, or construction, is “[a]n in-
terpretation that looks to the ‘evil’ that the statute is trying to correct (i.e., 
the statute’s purpose).”
423
 Due to this teleological approach, “[t]he ECJ 
gives the interpretation most likely to further what it considers that provi-
sion in its context was aimed to achieve. Often this is very far from a liter-
al interpretation of the Treaty and may even fly in the face of the express 
language.”
424
 Examples of the courts using a teleological approach can be 
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found in Commission v. Belgium,
425
 and R. (on the application of Univer-
sity of Cambridge) v. HM Treasury.
426
 In the specific context of mergers, 
the ECJ held that an EU Regulation must be interpreted “by reference to 
its purpose and general structure.”
427
 As a general proposition, part of the 
reason behind the adoption of the teleological approach can be found in 
the different legal cultures of the Member States. Because of differences in 
language and legal culture between the Member States, “the scope of the 
provision at issue cannot be appraised solely on the basis of a textual in-
terpretation. Its meaning must therefore be clarified in the light of ... its 
place in the system of Community law ... and its purpose.”
428
 
This teleological approach clearly has the potential to clash with the 
Commission’s consumer welfare approach, particularly because under 
Article 267(a) TFEU the Court of Justice of the European Union has ulti-
mate authority to determine “the interpretation of the Treaties.”
429
 Using 
their authority and the teleological approach, the courts have incorporated 
non-efficiency goals into Article 101 and balanced competition against 
other Union objectives.
430
 However, before Lisbon, the Commission’s 
consumer welfare view seemed to be in the ascendant. Monti commented 
that, “the future relevance of non-economic public policy considerations is 
bleak.”
431
 Prior to Lisbon, the Commission published documents stating 
that the sole goal of competition law is consumer welfare.
432
 Academics 
supported the Commission and argued that Article 101 “should be libe-
rated” from non-efficiency goals.
433
 Furthermore, in GlaxoSmithKline 
Services v. Commission the Court of First Instance held that “the objective 
assigned to Art. [101(1) TFEU] ... is to prevent undertakings, by restrict-
ing competition between themselves or with third parties, from reducing 
the welfare of the final consumer of the products.”
434
 The CFI’s GlaxoS-
mithKline judgment finally gave the Commission’s consumer welfare goal 
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an air of legitimacy.
435
 As Townley noted, there had previously been no 
basis for the Commission’s position: 
The Commission has not sought to justify its adoption of a unitary ob-
jective on theoretical grounds. Its guidelines claim that they outline the 
current state of the case law. However, there is general consensus that 
public policy goals have been considered within Article [101] EC; and 
the Community Courts’ (European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of 
First Instance (CFI)) judgments continue to do so today (as do many of 
the Commission’s own Article [101](3) decisions).436 
However, this sole consumer welfare goal of Article 101 was not ac-
cepted by the ECJ,
437
 which leaves the Commission without any legitima-
cy for its consumer welfare claims. The strengthening of policy-linking 
clauses and the removal of Article 3(1)(g) EC from the TFEU also further 
undermine the Commission’s ambitions for a sole consumer welfare goal. 
It is therefore arguably clear that Lisbon tilted the direction of competition 
law back towards the multiple goals of competition law favored by teleo-
logical interpretation. It is equally clear that, in spite of what Evans be-
lieves, the courts do not give “the Commission a great deal of defe-
rence.”
438
 
C. The Political Dimension of European Commission Decision-Making 
It therefore seems that the European Commission’s efforts to get con-
sumer welfare recognized as the sole goal of Article 101 are faltering, if 
not entirely failed. However, there is another issue that complicates Com-
mission decision-making; although the Directorate General for Competi-
tion investigates firm conduct to determine whether it violates Article 101, 
the ultimate decision as to whether to permit or prohibit conduct under 
Article 101 falls to the twenty-seven European Commissioners.
439
 The 
College of Commissioners vote collectively on whether to adopt a deci-
sion,
440
 and any discussions relating to a Commission decision “shall be 
confidential.”
441
 This means the actual reasoning of the Commissioners 
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remains hidden, as the Commissioners may well adopt “compromise solu-
tions which the text of the decision may fail to reflect.”
442
 
Monti points to the de Havilland
443
 decision to highlight how political 
considerations come into play when decisions are put before the College 
of Commissioners, and the impact of personalities upon decision-
making.
444
 Monti explains that the de Havilland merger was prohibited 
because the then Commissioner for Competition, Leon Brittan, was a 
consumer welfare advocate, whereas other Commissioners wanted to 
approve the merger because of the beneficial non-efficiency effects.
445
 
From Monti’s discussion of the decision to prohibit the de Havilland 
merger, it seems obvious that personalities play a part in the enforcement 
of EU competition law.
 
As such, it is relevant to consider the personality 
and politics of the Commissioner for Competition. In February 2010, Joa-
quín Almunia replaced Neelie Kroes as the Commissioner for Competi-
tion.
446
 Neelie Kroes, who frequently made statements in support of the 
sole consumer welfare aim during her tenure as Competition Commission-
er,
447
 is a member of the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democra-
cy
448
 which has a conservative-liberal ideology.
449
 This places Kroes on 
the center-right of the political spectrum, in contrast to her successor, 
Almunia, who is a member of, and former prime ministerial candidate for, 
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Par-
ty).
450
 As the name suggests, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party has a 
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ropean Consumer and Competition Day: European Competition Policy – Delivering 
Better Markets and Better Choices 2 (Sept. 15, 2005) (Stating: “Consumer welfare is now 
well established as the standard the Commission applies”), available at http://europa.eu 
/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
448 Biography for Neelie Kroes, SILOBREAKER, http://www.silobreaker.com/biogra 
phy-for-neelie-kroes-5_2258144848529850368_4 (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
449 Netherlands, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN EUROPE, http://www.parties-and-elec 
tions.de/netherlands.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
450 See, Joaquin Almunia CV, supra note 446. 
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center-left or social-democratic ideology.
451
 Given the change in personnel 
at the Commissioner level, it could be submitted that Almunia may prove 
to be more receptive to non-efficiency concerns, such as employment, than 
Kroes. Nevertheless, Kroes remains a Commissioner (now for Digital 
Agenda and as a Vice President of the Commission
452
) and a formal 
Commission decision is reached collectively by the College of Commis-
sioners.
453
 As such, there is an argument to be made that Almunia becom-
ing Competition Commissioner will not impact the Commission’s deci-
sions, as Kroes will still be in a position to influence other Commissioners. 
Accordingly, the argument would run that Almunia’s appointment will not 
result in a change in the enforcement priorities or aims of EU competition 
law. However, it is possible that Almunia’s influence could result in the 
Directorate-General for Competition accounting for a broader range of 
competition goals during their investigations, which would, in turn, 
present the College with different choices than they would have had when 
the Competition Commissioner was a consumer welfare purist. 
V. BALANCING EMPLOYMENT AND CONSUMER WELFARE UNDER 
ARTICLE 101—RULE OF REASON OR LEGAL EXCEPTION ANALYSIS? 
Now that it has been clarified that consumer welfare should be ba-
lanced against other aims as a general principle, and that this is particular-
ly true in the European Union—because of the policy-linking clauses—it 
needs to be determined where exactly this balancing should take place. 
Article 101 has a bifurcated structure, meaning that such a balancing test 
could take place under either Article 101(1), (3), or both.
454
 A conserva-
tive interpretation of Article 101 is that Article 101(1) covers the prohi-
bited activity, and the possibility that such activity can be excepted is dealt 
with in (3). In order to consider whether this conservative interpretation is 
correct, this Article will examine: the “rule of reason”
455
 approach, where-
by a balancing test is conducted within Article 101(1)—the traditional 
approach of prohibiting under (1) and exempting under (3)—and a balanc-
ing approach, which incorporates consideration of pro- and anticompeti-
                                                 
451 Spain, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN EUROPE, http://www.parties-and-elections.de 
/spain.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
452 European Commission, Vice-President of the European Commission, Neelie Kroes 
CV, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/about/cv/index_en.htm 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
453 See supra notes 440–42. 
454 TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101. 
455 Vincent Verouden, Vertical Agreements and Article 81(1) EC: The Evolving Role 
of Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 525, 553 (2003). 
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tive effects under both Article 101(1) and (3). First, rule of reason analysis 
will be considered, then legal exception analysis, and finally, a bifurcated 
balancing approach will be examined. 
A. Rule of Reason Analysis under Article 101(1) 
Adopting a rule of reason approach for balancing is not without con-
troversy. As Callery states: “The existence of a ‘rule of reason’ in EU law 
has been perhaps the most disputed issue in European legal circles.”
456
 In 
this section, the following will be discussed: the origins of the rule of 
reason in U.S. antitrust law; the debate over the existence of a European 
rule of reason; and the ancillary restraints doctrine. 
Before considering the origins of the rule of reason, it is necessary to 
understand what “rule of reason” means. Rule of reason analysis, at least 
as the term is understood in U.S. antitrust law, is a “freewheeling in-
quiry”
457
 which allows the courts to consider all the circumstances of an 
agreement in order to determine if the overall effect of the agreement is 
procompetitive or anticompetitive. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained 
the rule of reason as being where “the factfinder weighs all of the circums-
tances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohi-
bited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”
458
 The rule of 
reason, therefore, allows a case-by-case analysis of the conduct in question 
without having to adhere to a strict set of pre-determined rules, which by 
their nature automatically declare conduct permissible or prohibited with-
out further inquiry (such rules are referred to as “per se” rules
459
). 
The rule of reason is generally considered to have arisen in the United 
States.
460
 This is because if Section 1 of the Sherman Act is read literally, 
then any and all agreements in restraint of trade would have been declared 
illegal.
461
 The U.S. Supreme Court initially took this approach in United 
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association.
462
 Such an approach clearly 
has the potential to be wildly over-inclusive. An embryonic rule of reason 
was first espoused in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States 
where it was held that the purpose of the Sherman Act “was to prevent 
                                                 
456 Craig Callery, Should the European Union Embrace or Exorcise Leegin’s “Rule of 
Reason”?, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 42, 42 (2011). 
457 POSNER, supra note 87, at 39. 
458 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
459 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940). 
460 MONTI, supra note 36, at 29. 
461 Sherman Act of 1890 § 1, 15 U.S.C § 1 (2006). 
462 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897). 
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undue restraints” of trade.
463
 The classic explanation of the rule of reason 
was given by Justice Brandeis: 
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so 
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement con-
cerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, 
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy com-
petition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable.464 
The rule of reason has since advanced and solidified as the cornerstone 
of analysis in U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court has again and again 
held that the rule of reason analysis should be employed to determine 
whether an agreement is anticompetitive,
465
 whereas the importance of 
inflexible per se rules has declined.
466
 
However, Minda suggests that the perceived wisdom that the rule of 
reason is an American concept is wrong. Minda points to a nineteenth 
century House of Lords decision as the original rule of reason analysis in 
competition law.
467
 In Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammuni-
tion Co., Lord Macnaghten held that: 
[R]estraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action 
may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a 
sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the re-
striction is reasonable—reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests 
of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of 
the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to 
the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in 
no way injurious to the public.468 
                                                 
463 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). 
464 Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
465 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877 
(2007); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dent-
ists, 476 U.S. 447, 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 86 (1984); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
466 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
467 See Gary Minda, The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 461, 
492 (1989). 
468 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, 565 
(appeal taken from C.A.) (Eng.). 
2012] COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING 119 
 
This is clearly an articulation of the rule of reason. Given that Norden-
felt was decided seventeen years before Standard Oil, it can be submitted 
that it is entirely possible that Nordenfelt influenced the Supreme Court’s 
thinking on the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as Minda 
suggests.
469
 In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals did acknowledge the importance of Nordenfelt when 
determining whether a restraint of trade should be declared illegal.
470
 Re-
gardless of the fact that the rule of reason may have originated on a differ-
ent side of the Atlantic than is ordinarily supposed, it is clear that the rule 
of reason constitutes a balancing test: a determination of whether the bene-
fits of the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive parts of the agreement. 
What is still not entirely clear though is whether a rule of reason exists in 
European competition law. It should also be noted that the U.S.-style rule 
of reason goes hand in hand with economic efficiency and consumer wel-
fare, because it only examines “the economic consequences of a chal-
lenged agreement.”
471
 This raises the question of whether such a purely 
economic efficiency test has a place in European competition law. 
There are two aspects to the debate over a rule of reason in EU compe-
tition law. First, determining if such a rule of reason actually exists; 
second, the benefits—or otherwise—of incorporating a rule of reason into 
Article 101(1). These two aspects will be examined in turn. 
When it comes to determining the existence of a rule of reason, the 
case law is hardly a model of clarity; it is arguable that the case law points 
in two contradictory directions. In spite of this, this Article will seek to 
demonstrate that the jurisprudence has incorporated something like a rule 
of reason into Article 101(1). Accordingly, it is accurate to state that “the 
rule of reason has not yet crystallized as a valid standard by which to ana-
lyze agreements in the European Union.”
472
 However, it is not accurate for 
Reindl to state that the European courts have wholeheartedly rejected the 
American rule of reason approach and “are settled on this issue.”
473
 This is 
because, while there is a rule of reason, or something resembling it, exist-
ing in European competition law, its scope is vaguely defined. As such, it 
                                                 
469 See Minda, supra note 467, at 519–20. 
470 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d 
as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
471 POSNER, supra note 87, at 38. 
472 Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights From U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and 
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European 
Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 559, 625 (1995). 
473 Andreas P. Reindl, Resale Price Maintenance and Article 101: Developing a More 
Sensible Analytical Approach, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1300, 1314 (2010). 
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is ambitious to state that the European rule of reason is categorically not 
capable of being an economic efficiency test along the lines of the U.S. 
rule of reason. Although this Article would submit that the EU should not 
adopt the U.S. rule of reason, it is simply wrong to suggest that this area of 
law is settled. 
The first case in which the ECJ was asked to consider the existence of 
a rule of reason was Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm 
GmbH, where the Court called for a wide-ranging analysis of the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects of the agreement in question.
474
 The balancing test 
called for in Société Technique Minière can clearly be seen as a form of 
rule of reason analysis.
475
 However, only a fortnight later in Consten & 
Grundig, the ECJ held that there would be no rule of reason analysis, 
“once it appears that [an agreement] has as its object the prevention, re-
striction or distortion of competition.”
476
 As such, in the course of two 
weeks in the summer of 1966, the ECJ laid the grounds for the confusion 
regarding the possibility of rule of reason analysis under Article 101(1), 
which has now persisted for over fifty years. However, Nazzini argues that 
the two cases can be reconciled on the basis that Consten & Grundig “is 
confined to agreements having the object of partitioning the common 
market” (that is, partitioning of the single market is essentially per se pro-
hibited) and Société Technique Minière “is of general application.”
477
 This 
means that the courts should apply a balancing test unless the intention of 
the agreement undermines the EU’s single-market aim. 
In two later decisions of the ECJ, Metro SB-Grossmärkte
478
 and L.C. 
Nungesser KG v. Commission of the European Communities,
479
 the Court 
weighed the negative effects of the agreements in question against their 
benefits.
480
 The ECJ conducted this analysis under Article 101(1) and 
                                                 
474 See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 
E.C.R. 235, 250. 
475 See id. at 249–50 (noting “the need to consider the precise purpose of the agree-
ment, in the economic context in which it is to be applied” and that “[t]he competition in 
question must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in the 
absence of the agreement in dispute”). 
476 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 342. 
477 Renato Nazzini, Article 81 EC Between Time Present and Time Past: A Normative 
Critique of “Restriction of Competition” in EU Law, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 497, 510 
(2006). 
478 Case 26/76, Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R. 
1875. 
479 Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015. 
480 See id. ¶ 33; Metro SB- Grossmärkte GmbH, E.C.R. 1875 ¶ 21. 
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concluded that the agreements were not “prohibit[ed]”
481
 or “incompati-
ble”
482
 with 101(1). This developing rule of reason analysis has been de-
scribed by Verouden as the European courts looking “beyond the negative 
elements of agreements in their analysis under Article [101(1)] in order to 
determine the actual economic impact on the market.”
483
 This rule of rea-
son approach was clarified in European Night Services v. Commission of 
the European Communities, where it was held that, “in assessing an 
agreement under Article [101(1)] of the Treaty, account should be taken of 
the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the economic 
context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services cov-
ered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market con-
cerned.”
484
 
Based on the case law examined so far, it would appear that the juri-
sprudence of the European courts was developing a rule of reason. In 
1999, the ECJ took balancing further still by balancing the promotion of a 
high level of employment against competition, instead of simply weighing 
pro- and anticompetitive effects within Article 101(1).
485
 In Albany Inter-
national v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, the ECJ con-
sidered the anticompetitive effects of collective bargaining, and held that 
such agreements fell “outside the scope of Article [101(1)] of the Trea-
ty.”
486
 Although Albany International dealt with an area of law that has 
historically been excluded from the remit of competition law—collective 
bargaining—the case does provide a limited foundation for arguing that 
agreements which have a positive impact on employment levels should not 
be prohibited under Article 101(1).
487
 
However, despite the establishment of a rule of reason analysis by the 
late twentieth-century, the concept was to come under assault by the Court 
of First Instance in the twenty-first.
 
In Métropole Télévision v. Commis-
                                                 
481 See Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH, 1977 E.C.R. 1875 ¶¶ 20–21. 
482 See L.C. Nungesser KG, 1982 E.C.R. 2015 ¶ 58. 
483 Verouden, supra note 455, at 553. 
484 Joined Cases T-374, T-375, T-384 & T-388/94, Eur. Night Servs. v. Comm’n, 
1998 E.C.R. II-3141, ¶ 136. 
485 See Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielin-
dustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751, ¶ 54. 
486 Id. ¶ 60. 
487 See id. ¶ 59 (“It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inhe-
rent in collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. 
However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously 
undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [101(1)] of the Treaty 
when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employ-
ment.”). 
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sion of the European Communities, the CFI stated that, “the existence of a 
rule of reason in [Union] competition law is doubtful.”
488
 The reasoning of 
the CFI was largely based on the use of the word “even” by the ECJ in 
Montecatini SpA v. Commission of the European Communities: “[E]ven if 
the rule of reason did have a place in the context of Article [101(1)] of the 
Treaty.”
489
 In Montecatini, the ECJ essentially stated that a rule of reason 
analysis was not necessary because the challenged agreement was so 
clearly anticompetitive.
490
 Given that the proceedings in Montecatini did 
not involve rule of reason analysis, the doubt cast by the use of “even” in 
this judgment is arguably relatively minimal.
491
 This is especially apparent 
when such doubt is balanced against the clear statements of the require-
ment of a balancing test in Metro SB-Grossmärkte and European Night 
Services.
492
 
Six months later, the ECJ held: “For the purposes of application of that 
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the 
overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings 
was taken or produces its effects.”
493
 This is a restatement of the rule of 
reason, or balancing, test. However, the ECJ went further still. Wouters 
built on Albany International by holding that public policy arguments 
could be used to “trump” competition, thus meaning that any such activi-
ties or agreements that promoted public-policy would not infringe Article 
101(1).
494
 Monti has described the approach used in Wouters as the “Eu-
ropean-style rule of reason.”
495
 This European-style rule of reason allows 
anticompetitive effects to be balanced both against the procompetitive 
effects of the agreement and “social and political concerns.”
496
 Due to this 
recognition of a form of rule of reason analysis, “[i]t should now be rec-
ognized that Wouters has implicitly overruled Métropole.”
497
 
In spite of Wouters, the CFI hardened its stance against the rule of rea-
son. In Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, the CFI stated that, “the Court would point out that the existence of 
                                                 
488 Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459, ¶ 72. 
489 Case C-235/92 P, Montecatini SpA v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4539, ¶ 133. 
490 Id. ¶ 132. 
491 See id. 
492 See supra notes 478–84 and accompanying text. 
493 Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advoca-
ten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, ¶ 97. 
494 See id. ¶ 110. 
495 Monti, Public Policy, supra note 307, at 1088. 
496 Callery, supra note 456, at 47 (arguing that Wouters goes beyond analysis of “pure 
competition factors” and calls for “consideration of non-competition factors” as well). 
497 Nazzini, supra note 477, at 535. 
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such a rule in Community competition law is not accepted.”
498
 In O2 
(Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, the CFI stated that recognition of a rule of reason under Article 
101(1) would be “in contradiction to the case-law.”
499
 The CFI’s contin-
ued insistence that there is no rule of reason is somewhat bizarre, but is 
perhaps based on the fact that the cases that lay out a rule of reason do not 
refer to the form of analysis adopted as a “rule of reason.”
500
 Despite not 
calling the form of analysis a rule of reason, the approach used is clearly a 
balancing test, which bears similarities to the freewheeling inquiry of U.S. 
antitrust. What is particularly interesting is that in O2 Germany, the CFI 
dismissed any suggestions regarding the existence of a rule of reason, 
before laying out a counterfactual inquiry
501
 that seems very similar to the 
balancing approach required by a rule of reason analysis.
502
 In Meca-
Medina v. Commission of the European Communities, the ECJ once again 
reiterated that a balancing test should be conducted under Article 101(1): 
                                                 
498 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4653, ¶ 106. 
499 Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-1231, ¶ 65. 
500 See supra notes 478–99 and accompanying text. The court commonly refers to a 
need to “examine the economic and legal context in which the agreement was concluded” 
and “in which the undertakings operate.” O2 (Germany), E.C.R. II-1231 ¶ 66 (citing Case 
22/71, Bèguelin Import v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949, ¶ 13); Case 
C-399/93, H.G. Oude Littikhuis v. Verenigde Coöperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco, 1995 
E.C.R. I-4515, ¶ 10); see also O2 (Germany), E.C.R. II-1231 ¶ 71 (“The examination 
required in the light of Article [101(1) TFEU] consists essentially in taking account of the 
impact of the agreement on existing and potential competition and the competition situa-
tion in the absence of the agreement, those two factors being intrinsically linked.”) (citing 
Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 E.C.R. I-935, ¶ 21; Case 56/65, 
Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 249–50). 
501 O2 (Germany), E.C.R. II-1231, ¶ 71. 
502 See Mel Marquis, O2 (Germany) v. Commission and the Exotic Mysteries of Ar-
ticle 81(1) EC, 32 EUR. L. REV. 29, 45 (2007) (“[T]he CFI seems to be applying the kind 
of searching inquiry that it applied in European Night Services, and it seems to be carry-
ing out an assessment that looks suspiciously like balancing.”). 
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Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an as-
sociation of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the 
parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid 
down in [Article 101(1) TFEU]. For the purposes of application of that 
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the 
overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings 
was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objec-
tives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects re-
strictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives 
and are proportionate to them.503 
This restatement that a balancing test can be conducted under Article 
101(1) might serve to curb the CFI’s obsession with denying the existence 
of such a test. It can therefore be submitted that Meca-Medina overrules 
the denials of a rule of reason in Van den Bergh Foods and O2 Germany. 
However, in Meca-Medina, the ECJ still did not specifically use the 
phrase “rule of reason”—indeed the ECJ has used the terminology “rule of 
reason” only in passing.
504
 This raises the question: what is the appropriate 
terminology for the balancing test the ECJ is so clearly using? 
Whish and Sufrin suggest that the phrase “rule of reason” should not 
be used in European competition law, because “it invites misleading com-
parison with antitrust law analysis in the United States.”
505
 There is cer-
tainly truth in this criticism. The U.S. rule of reason is a balancing test 
seeking to ensure that consumer welfare will ultimately be benefited by an 
agreement.
506
 In contrast, the European-style rule of reason is more holis-
tic, as the rule considers not only the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an 
agreement, but also public policy considerations.
507
 Accordingly, the U.S. 
rule of reason and the European-style rule of reason are, despite being 
related, not identical twins. As such, there is certainly an advantage to the 
                                                 
503 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991, ¶ 42 (citation 
omitted). 
504 See, e.g., Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 
299, 342 (characterizing Grundig’s argument as seeking the application of a rule of 
reason); Case C-235/92 P, Montecatini SpA v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4539, ¶ 45 (dis-
cussing the CFI’s refusal to apply a rule of reason to the case); Case C-552/03 P, Unilev-
er Bestfoods v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-9091, ¶ 13 (discussing the CFI’s rejection of 
HB’s argument for application of a rule of reason). 
505 Richard Whish & Brenda Sufrin, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 7 Y.B. EUR. L. 
1, 37 (1987). 
506 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (“In 
its design and function the rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticom-
petitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that 
are in the consumer’s best interest.”). 
507 See infra Part V.B. 
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ECJ labeling the balancing test they have developed, as this would provide 
clarity. It can be submitted that the ECJ should take the earliest opportuni-
ty to lay down the precise scope of the balancing test that has been devel-
oped, and then christen the test. Although this author would prefer termi-
nology other than “rule of reason,” the phrase is not so inaccurate as to be 
without meaning and will suffice until something more accurate comes 
along. 
Whish also argues against the very existence of a rule of reason, writ-
ing that “reasonable judgments” do not make a rule of reason.
508
 This 
author would have to disagree with Professor Whish on this point. In all its 
guises, the rule of reason is a balancing test. When a court reasonably 
takes into account the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an agreement 
and balances them against one another, then that court is conducting a rule 
of reason analysis. Therefore, it is arguable that when the courts embark 
on a counterfactual analysis,
509
 or balance pro- and anticompetitive effects 
on the basis that the anticompetitive effects are merely “ancillary re-
straints,”
510
 the court is in fact carrying out a form of rule of reason analy-
sis. Despite the ECJ’s reticence to adopt the phrase, the case law goes to 
show that the rule of reason balancing test smells as sweet by any other 
name.
511
 
An argument against a rule of reason is that the rule, or any form of 
balancing test, “imposes a great burden on the judiciary.”
512
 It is possible 
to argue that removing a rule of reason-type balancing test from Article 
101(1) would not reduce the burden; any such burden would simply be 
shifted into Article 101(3). Therefore, removing a rule of reason-type 
balancing test from Article 101(1) arguably might not streamline cases; 
instead, parties would try to shoehorn their analysis into the exemptions 
allowed by Article 101(3), despite the fact the exemptions listed may not 
be appropriate.
513
 This Article submits that forcing the parties to balance 
pro- and anticompetitive effects under inappropriate Article 101(3) ex-
emptions may ultimately lead to confusion and increase the burden on the 
judiciary. 
                                                 
508 WHISH, supra note 24, at 131. 
509 See, e.g., Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-1231, 
¶ 71. 
510 See, e.g., Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforening v. Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab AmbA, 1994 E.C.R. I-5641, ¶ 19. 
511 See infra notes 522–34 and accompanying text. 
512 Whish & Sufrin, supra note 505, at 7. 
513 See TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(3). Article 101(3) is made up of four require-
ments that a restrictive agreement must meet in order to receive an exemption from the 
provisions of Article 101(1). See infra notes 536–39 and accompanying text. 
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The existence of Article 101(3) is the main objection to the existence 
of a rule of reason-type analysis under Article 101(1). This is particularly 
pertinent since the “Modernisation Regulation” came into force in 2004.
514
 
The Modernisation Regulation gave the National Competition Authori-
ties
515
 and the national courts
516
 power to exempt agreements under Ar-
ticle 101(3). Exempting, or excepting, under Article 101(3) had previously 
been the exclusive reserve of the Commission.
517
 The purpose of the Mod-
ernisation Regulation was to “allow the Commission to increase its ability 
to take on cases of [Union] interest and become more proactive. The result 
is to multiply the number of agencies able to enforce [EU] competition 
law, leading to more rigorous enforcement.”
518
 However, the risk arises 
that with multiple agencies and countless courts in twenty-seven Member 
States with the power to consider Article 101 in its entirety, there is a clear 
temptation to bundle prohibition and exception into one rule of reason 
analysis. For this reason, the Commission, wanting to ensure “consistency 
in ... enforcement” despite this “era of decentralisation,” established the 
European Competition Network (ECN).
519
 The aim of the ECN is to en-
sure that the Commission and the National Commission Authorities con-
tinue to use the same reasoning and form of analysis.
520
 Whether the pro-
motion of a high level of employment may find a more suitable home 
under Article 101(3) will be considered below,
521
 but before doing so, the 
ancillary restraints doctrine will be discussed. The ancillary restraints 
doctrine is a form of the rule of reason which has found favor, and been 
named, by the European courts.
522
 However, it is submitted that it is per-
haps not suitable for consideration of employment. 
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The ancillary restraints doctrine was first laid down, in the United 
States, in Addyston Pipe by then-Judge Taft.
523
 An ancillary restraint is 
where a restriction on competition is “merely ancillary to the main pur-
pose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the 
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract.”
524
 Essentially, the ancil-
lary restraints doctrine allows that some restrictions on competition are 
necessary in order to protect the procompetitive objective of the agree-
ment. The ECJ has allowed such agreements, and therefore held that such 
agreements were not prohibited by Article 101(1), which contained ancil-
lary restraints such as: selective distribution systems,
525
 exclusive license 
agreements,
526
 and joint buying cooperatives.
527
 On the basis of the case 
law, it would seem that the ancillary restraints doctrine would not apply to 
the promotion of a high level of employment, given that the ECJ has used 
the doctrine to allow anticompetitive contractual terms in order to make 
the overall agreement function properly.
528
 However, Faull and Nikpay 
argue that the Commission decision of EPI Code of Conduct,
529
 and the 
judgments in Wouters
530
 and Meca-Medina
531
 have created a “public in-
terest objective” form of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
532
 It can be ar-
gued that the public interest ancillary restraints doctrine is no more than 
another phrase for the European rule of reason. As such, the same murky 
limits apply and, as Faull and Nikpay explain, “[t]he doctrine cannot 
therefore be applied with certainty.”
533
 
                                                                                                                         
any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main 
operation.”) (internal citations omitted). But see id. ¶ 107 (“[I]t must be observed that 
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aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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E.C.R. 1875, ¶¶ 42–52. 
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ten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577. 
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Balancing within Article 101(1), whether we call it a rule of reason 
analysis or the ancillary restraints doctrine, offers great possibilities but 
little that is tangible and which can be relied upon. This is particularly true 
given the CFI’s seeming hostility to a rule of reason, because: “[T]he 
creation of the CFI necessarily reduces the ECJ’s control over develop-
ments in the system. No longer is there one judicial voice, there are 
two.”
534
 Accordingly, incorporating the promotion of a high level of em-
ployment into the test laid out in Article 101(3) will now be considered. 
Additionally, in spite of the potential shown by Wouters, the limits of such 
potential have yet to be defined, making it a risky road for parties to travel 
down if they are seeking exemption of an agreement. 
B. Legal Exception Analysis under Article 101(3) 
Article 101(3) offers salvation to agreements that would otherwise be 
prohibited and therefore void under Article 101(1).
535
 In order for an 
agreement to be excepted under Article 101(3), the agreement must meet 
four requirements, two positive and two negative. Positively, it must be 
shown that the agreement “contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress” and 
allows “consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”
536
 In addition to 
these positive requirements, the agreement must not: (a) “impose on the 
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives”; and (b) “afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition.”
537
 Both the ECJ
538
 and the Com-
mission
539
 have stated that all four conditions must be satisfied in order for 
Article 101(3) to except an agreement. 
So what is needed for an agreement to meet these requirements? The 
first requirement of improvement or progress can be seen in very general 
terms as a “benefit ... of objective value to the [Union] as a whole.”
540
 The 
second requirement is that such a benefit must be passed on to consum-
                                                 
534 TOWNLEY, supra note 83, at 212. 
535 See TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(3). 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
538 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios, 
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539 Article 81(3) Guidelines, supra note 182, ¶ 42 (“According to settled case law the 
four conditions of Article 81(3) are cumulative, i.e. they must all be fulfilled for the 
exception rule to be applicable.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ers.
541
 The Commission defines consumers as “all direct or indirect users 
of the products covered by the agreement .... In other words, consumers 
within the meaning of Article [101(3)] are the customers of the parties to 
the agreement and subsequent purchasers.”
542
 This is a fairly narrow defi-
nition; it may well be too narrow to allow the promotion of a high level of 
employment to be considered under Article 101(3). The narrowness or 
breadth of Article 101(3) will be considered below.
543
 In order for an 
agreement that sought to promote a high level of employment to meet the 
third requirement of indispensability, the parties would have to show “that 
there are no other economically practicable and less restrictive means”
544
 
of achieving the benefits to employment levels. This test requires the par-
ties to show that there was not another type of less anticompetitive agree-
ment they could have relied upon to achieve the same objective.
545
 How-
ever, “[t]he Commission will not second guess the business judgment of 
the parties.”
546
 The final test is to demonstrate that competition is not 
utterly destroyed by the agreement.
547
 
It is questionable if these four tests can be interpreted in such a way as 
to balance employment against consumer welfare. This is not easy to an-
swer. Odudu has written that “[i]t remains ‘controversial what exactly 
remains to be considered under Article [101(3)].’”
548
 Whish identifies two 
general views of what can be considered under Article 101(3): the “narrow 
view” and the “broader view.”
549
 Under the narrow view, Article 101(3) 
can only consider economic efficiency issues, whereas the broader view 
allows for a wider range of policy issues to be considered within 101(3).
550
 
In order to determine what may be considered under Article 101(3), an 
attempt needs to be made to discover whether the narrow view or the 
broader view prevails. 
Townley states that “Article [101(3)]’s wording seems too narrow to 
include many objectives.”
551
 On the basis of Article 101(3)’s wording 
alone, this author is inclined to agree, particularly when Article 101(3) is 
read in conjunction with the Commission’s Article 81(3) Guidelines (the 
                                                 
541 See TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(3). 
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Guidelines). The Guidelines relentlessly pursue an economic efficien-
cy/consumer welfare standard for the application of Article 101(3).
552
 The 
Guidelines speak of agreements being excepted because of their “positive 
economic effects”
553
 or “pro-competitive effects.”
554
 This is the language 
of consumer welfare purists; while reducing unemployment is likely to 
benefit society as a whole, such an objective is unlikely to be considered a 
procompetitive effect under a consumer welfare analysis.
555
 The Guide-
lines go on to state that “[g]oals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be 
taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four 
conditions of Article [101](3).”
556
 This clearly demonstrates that in the 
Commission’s opinion there is no room for goals such as Article 9’s pro-
motion of a high level of employment. The Commission’s White Paper 
also stated that Article 101 could not “be set aside because of political 
considerations.”
557
 
Balancing employment against consumer welfare would probably be 
considered a goal that could not be incorporated into an Article 101(3) 
assessment in the Commission’s post-Guidelines world. However, it has 
already been argued that in a post-Lisbon world, competition has been 
downgraded as a Union goal.
558
 It is also important to bear in mind that 
the Guidelines are in no way binding on the Union’s courts.
559
 Once all 
this is taken into consideration, it can be submitted that the Guidelines and 
their pursuit of a sole consumer welfare standard was a temporary aberra-
tion. 
In support of this we can look back prior to the Guidelines, and see ex-
amples of agreements that promoted employment being excepted. In Me-
tro-SB-Grossmärkte, the ECJ held: 
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[T]he establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period consti-
tutes a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of employment 
which, since it improves the general conditions of production, especial-
ly when the market conditions are unfavourable, comes within the 
framework of the objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to 
Article [101(3)].560 
Therefore, the ECJ was able to allow an agreement because it pro-
moted employment; however, Faull and Nikpay state that the economic 
benefit was not the promotion of employment per se, but because em-
ployment improved production.
561
 Nevertheless, the effect is the same. 
Similarly, in Matra Hachette, the CFI stated that the Commission did not 
consider the promotion of employment as a legitimate consideration under 
Article 101(3).
562
 However, the Commission excepted the Joint Venture 
between Ford and Volkswagen
563
 under Article 101(3), and the CFI 
upheld their decision.
564
 Faull and Nikpay see Matra Hachette as “con-
firming the fact that the benefits in question [employment] did not consti-
tute objective benefits within the meaning of Article [101(3)].”
565
 
Arguably Faull and Nikpay are naïve to take the reasoning of the 
Commission or the Union Courts at face value. Townley writes: 
[T]he Commission is rarely explicit about what it is trying to do; nor-
mally fails to quantify any costs or benefits that it considers; and, sel-
dom places its analysis within a wider framework, which would allow 
us to intuit what it is seeking to achieve, or to predict its assessment in 
future cases.566 
That being the case, it seems possible that the Commission (with the 
exception of the sole consumer welfare years) was always following a 
broader approach to Article 101(3) but may have preferred to shoehorn 
their analysis into a narrower reasoning. 
From a narrow perspective, there still remains the issue of benefiting 
consumers under Article 101(3), though it may be difficult to show that an 
agreement that promotes employment will be of benefit to consumers. 
Monti writes that, when the Commission has sought to use Article 101(3) 
                                                 
560 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R. 
1875, ¶ 43. 
561 Faull & Nikpay, supra note 22, at 295. 
562 Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette SA v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-00595, ¶ 139. 
563 Ford/Volkswagen (Case IV/33.814) Commission Decision 93/49/EEC, 1993 O.J. 
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564 Matra Hachette, E.C.R. II-595 ¶¶ 173–174. 
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to except agreements that have a public policy benefit, it has done so by 
“substitut[ing] the consumers’ interest with the interest of the public.”
567
 
Monti goes on to write that such benefits of general public interest “can 
only be considered under the first positive condition of Article [101(3)] 
and not the second.”
568
 In summary, the argument Monti advances is that 
“construing [the second positive requirement] in this way is problematic, 
because it collapses Article [101(3)]’s first and second tests.”
569
 This au-
thor would submit that this wider interpretation is potentially helpful, but 
would mean that if consumer benefit is synonymous with consumer wel-
fare, then it cannot be considered under Article 101(3) but must be consi-
dered elsewhere in Article 101. The problem that arises with a blinkered 
focus on consumer welfare is that it ignores society as a whole and indi-
viduals when they act as producers. 
This broader recognition of consumers was most famously employed 
by the Commission in CECED, where environmental benefits of an 
agreement that would accrue to the EU as a whole were considered to 
outweigh the anticompetitive fact that the price of washing machines was 
increased for consumers.
570
 The Commission stated: “Such environmental 
results for society would adequately allow consumers a fair share of the 
benefits even if no benefits accrued to individual purchasers of ma-
chines.”
571
 It could be proposed that the same broad argument can be 
made for the promotion of a high level of employment; increasing em-
ployment has a number of benefits for society as a whole, which may 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of such an agreement. 
Arguably, a broad reading of Article 101(3) in general, and the promo-
tion of a high level of employment in particular, is not as far-fetched as it 
first appears. In Métropole Télévision, the CFI made the following broad 
statement: “[I]n the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is 
entitled to base itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the 
public interest in order to grant exemption under Article [101(3)].”
572
 
Townley argues that this statement is wide enough to “incorporate the 
objectives pursued by the policy-linking clauses into the Article [101(3)] 
                                                 
567 Monti, Public Policy, supra note 307, at 1076. 
568 Id. at 1077. 
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test.”
573
 Furthermore, Townley states that industrial policy (which would 
include the promotion of employment) “is one of the most heavily used 
objectives in the Article [101(3)] balance.”
574
 Townley goes on to state 
that industrial policy is so important to the EU that it can trump not only 
consumer welfare but Article 173(3) TFEU
575
—which prohibits industrial 
policy from being used as the basis for distorting competition. Examples 
of the promotion of employment, based on a broad reading of Article 
101(3), have allowed employment to be recognized as a legitimate objec-
tive of an agreement by the ECJ in Metro-SB-Grossmärkte
576
 and the 
Commission in Ford/Volkswagen
577
 and Stichting Baksteen.
578
 Additional-
ly, in Piau, the CFI held that qualitative
579
 restrictions, limiting the num-
ber of agents for soccer players, were entitled to be excepted by the Com-
mission because they contributed “to promoting economic progress.”
580
 
This was an employment-related decision because it was concerned with 
managing the short playing careers of professional soccer players. The 
Piau decision seems to further highlight that employment is a relevant 
factor—one that the Commission and the European Courts will consider. 
Finally, in Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel, the 
CFI stated, quoting from the Merger Regulation (an issue in that case), 
that: “[T]he Commission must place its appraisal within the general 
framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives ... including 
that of strengthening the Community’s economic and social cohesion.”
581
 
Furthermore, the fact that employee organizations “have a relevant interest 
with respect to the social considerations which may in appropriate cases 
be taken into account by the Commission in the context of its appraisal of 
whether the concentration is lawful from the point of view of Community 
law.”
582
 Despite the fact that the CFI dismissed the case on the basis that 
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the plaintiffs’ procedural rights were not violated,
583
 the Vittel case further 
demonstrates the court’s willingness to consider employment as a legiti-
mate ground in competition cases. Therefore, this Article suggests that 
these precedents, reinforced by the policy-linking clauses of the TFEU, 
insist that employment is a relevant factor that must be balanced against 
consumer welfare, and that the appropriate place to consider employment 
is under Article 101(3). 
C. A Bifurcated Balancing Approach 
It is now established that the Article 9 goal of the promotion of a high 
level of employment must be considered when assessing an agreement 
under Article 101. Furthermore, the correct forum for considering em-
ployment and industrial policy is Article 101(3), as part of a broad reading 
which combines the two positive tests. To adopt such a broad reading is 
arguably not controversial: the Commission used this approach in 
CECED, and Townley states that the Union Courts have moved away 
“from the literal wording [of Article 101(3)] altogether and conduct[ ] a 
general public policy test there.”
584
 In fact, it can be argued that what is 
controversial is the Commission’s insistence in the Guidelines that a con-
sumer welfare goal must be the sole goal of Article 101.
585
 
However, under the present structure of Article 101(3), the two posi-
tive tests must be read broadly and in conjunction; this means that con-
sumer welfare is submerged into a general societal welfare test and there-
fore, consumer welfare is not considered at all.
586
 Given that consumer 
welfare is a necessary component of competition law, the question be-
comes where in Article 101 consumer welfare should be considered. 
Townley writes that the appropriate place for considering consumer 
welfare is under Article 101(1),
587
 with other public policy goals being 
balanced against consumer welfare under Article 101(3).
588
 Does Article 
101(1)’s wording allow a consumer welfare test to take place? The key 
words in Article 101(1) are: “[Agreements] hav[ing] as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market.”
589
 Competition is not defined in either of the Union trea-
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ties; indeed, at various points competition is referred to as “free,”
590
 
“fair”
591
 and “that competition is not distorted.”
592
 It is at least open to 
question whether such references to competition are even compatible. 
Therefore, just as the U.S. federal judiciary created the aims of the Sher-
man Act, the Union Courts can define the meaning of competition. 
In the CFI judgment of GlaxoSmithKline, it was held that: “[T]he ob-
jective assigned to Art. [101(1) TFEU] ... is to prevent undertakings, by 
restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, from 
reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in question.”
593
 
However, on appeal of the CFI’s decision, the ECJ stated that “that neither 
the wording of art. [101(1) TFEU] nor the case-law lend support to such a 
position”
594
 (that is, a sole consumer welfare goal). The ECJ then went on 
to state that Article 101 “aims to protect not only the interests of competi-
tors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such.”
595
 That being the case, it can be argued that Article 
101(1) has two aims, both grounded in economics: first, the consumer 
welfare test; and second, ensuring a market structure that maintains and 
promotes workable competition. Such a dual aim for Article 101(1) would 
be in keeping with the ECJ’s GlaxoSmithKline judgment, and would free 
up Article 101(3) for non-economic concerns. It would then fall to the 
decision-maker to determine if the non-economic benefits of an agreement 
trumped whatever the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were under 
Article 101(1). 
One final point: Article 101(3) has been described as a “formalized 
and specialized rule of reason.”
596
 This is the approach taken by the 
Commission,
597
 supported by the CFI in Métropole,
598
 and approved of by 
commentators.
599
 However, this is not strictly accurate—Article 101 in its 
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entirety is the European rule of reason. Unlike the U.S. rule of reason, the 
European rule is not entirely an economic efficiency test.
600
 This author 
would submit that, instead, it is a unique test influenced by both economic 
analysis and the broader public policy goals of the European Union. The 
first stage of the test is an analysis under Article 101(1), where the agree-
ment’s impact in terms of consumer welfare and market structure is as-
sessed. If the decision-maker concludes that the agreement has no anti-
competitive impact upon either consumer welfare or the structure of the 
market, then the agreement is allowed and no further assessment is re-
quired. However, if the agreement does fall foul of Article 101(1) because 
of its anticompetitive effects, the agreement may be saved (excepted) if 
the parties can prove, under Article 101(3), that the agreement serves a 
legitimate public policy goal. For the purposes of this Article, that goal is 
the promotion of a high level of employment. Finally, it falls to the deci-
sion-maker to determine if the public benefit under Article 101(3) out-
weighs the consumer welfare detriment under Article 101(1). Based on 
case law,
601
 previous Commission decisions,
602
 and the strengthening of 
policy-linking clauses combined with the downgrading of competition as a 
Union aim,
603
 it can be submitted that it is likely an agreement that signifi-
cantly impacts employment will be excepted. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that consumer welfare and 
broader public policy goals, specifically employment, should and must be 
balanced under Article 101. By interpreting Article 101 in such a way that 
consumer welfare is balanced against employment not only would be in 
keeping with the structure of the EU Treaties, but it would also, arguably, 
achieve social welfare. Social welfare would be achieved because balanc-
ing consumer welfare against employment would mean that competition 
law considered the individual as both a consumer and producer, without 
all benefits accruing overwhelmingly to either side. 
The introduction of Article 9 TFEU and the Article 7 TFEU integra-
tion clause means that employment has been established as a goal that 
must be considered under Article 101.
604
 To try and claim that Article 101 
                                                 
600 Article 81(3) Guidelines, supra note 182, ¶ 11. 
601 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R. 
1875. 
602 See supra notes 311–13, 342 and accompanying text. 
603 See supra Part III.H. 
604 See supra Part III.G. 
2012] COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING 137 
 
should be purely concerned with economic efficiency is to ignore EU 
goals such as employment, and would be wholly inconsistent with the 
structure of the EU Treaties. It is because of this treaty structure that the 
EU is unique and, as such, competition provisions, such as Article 101, are 
compelled to consider broader aims than mere economic efficiency. 
The holistic path that Article 101 is destined to tread because of the in-
tegration clauses and the ECJ’s teleological approach differs substantially 
from U.S. antitrust law. As such, the chances of convergence between the 
two regimes are negligible. However, the EU’s multiple values approach 
might arguably serve as a better example for nations or international or-
ganizations looking to develop their own competition regimes than U.S. 
antitrust. This is because the EU’s embrace of multiple values is more 
flexible than U.S. antitrust and more capable of adapting to different path 
dependencies, whereas the American insistence on a sole consumer wel-
fare goal does not take into account cultural differences or varying nation-
al attitudes towards the benefits of the free-market. In short, the EU has 
developed a stakeholder theory of competition law which is capable of 
representing the interests of individuals as consumers and producers, and 
society as a whole. 
In terms of where this balancing of consumer welfare and employment 
should occur, this Article proposes that consumer welfare, along with the 
other economic concerns of Article 101, should be considered under 
101(1) because this would leave 101(3) free to consider the public policy 
goals of the EU Treaties. Although such an analytical approach would 
necessitate a broad reading of Article 101(3), such a broad reading has 
been supported by the Commission
605
 and the Courts,
606
 and offers a clari-
ty that an Article 101(1) rule of reason-type analysis does not afford. 
While Wouters
607
 and Meca-Medina
608
 offer an appealing possibility of a 
public policy balancing test under Article 101(1), the courts have not de-
fined the limits of this rule of reason or ancillary restraints doctrine. Until 
the limits of Wouters are defined by further case law, Wouters offers only 
the temptation of what might be. 
That is not to say that the bifurcated balancing approach this Article 
proposes is without controversy or difficulty. For instance, those subscrib-
                                                 
605 See, e.g., CECED (Case IV.F.1/36.718) Commission Decision 2000/475/EC, 2000 
O.J. (L 187) 47, ¶¶ 55–57. 
606 See, e.g., Joined Cases T-528, T-542, T-543 & T-546/93, Métropole Télévision v. 
Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-649, ¶¶ 114–18. 
607 Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Order van Advo-
caten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, ¶ 97. 
608 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991, ¶¶ 30–31, 42. 
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ing to a narrow economic-efficiency reading of Article 101(3) will contin-
ue to insist that there is no place for public policy considerations with 
Article 101,
609
 or EU competition law in general. However, as suggested 
towards the beginning of this Article,
610
 the application of competition law 
is inherently controversial. It is not possible to give a competition regime 
aims without investing in that regime political values that some will find 
unpalatable. 
Economic efficiency has a vital role to play in the analysis of firm 
conduct, but a consumer welfare approach is not value-free. Therefore, 
judging firm conduct by a consumer welfare standard alone does not give 
us the complete picture. This is particularly true of the EU, given the inte-
gration clauses, which insist upon the permeation of all EU decision-
making with their myriad of values. This author concludes that the bifur-
cated balancing approach offers the best mechanism for weighing eco-
nomic efficiency goals against broader policy considerations, such as 
employment. 
                                                 
609 See, e.g., ODUDU, supra note 27, at 141. 
610 See supra Part I. 
